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I. INTRODUCTION
The Employment Non-Discrimination Act of
1997 ("ENDA"),' which was introduced in the
105th Congress on June 10, 1997, is intended to
remedy workplace discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation.2 The version of ENDA intro-
duced in the 104th Congress narrowly missed pas-
sage in the Senate by one vote. 3 During Senate
floor debate in 1996, a number of Senators raised
arguments in opposition to ENDA that mis-
characterized the impact of the legislation on the
rights of lesbian and gay public schoolteachers. 4
These arguments continue to be raised today by
ENDA's opponents.
Most of the concerns raised during Senate floor
debate are rooted in the belief that gay and les-
bian people are per se immoral and, therefore, are
bad role models for youth. Certain Senators ex-
pressed concern that the presence of a gay or les-
bian schoolteacher in the classroom somehow
would harm students. Thus, they argued that
ENDA should not be enacted because it would
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1 S. 869, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 1858 105th Cong.
(1997).
2 See 140 CONG. REc. S7581 (daily ed. June 23, 1994)
(statement of Sen. Kennedy). ENDA was first introduced in
the 103rd Congress. S. 2238, 103rd Cong. (1994), H.R. 4636,
103rd Cong. (1994).
prohibit public school authorities from categori-
cally disqualifying gay people from serving as
schoolteachers or in other positions in which they
have an influence over children.
For example, Senator John Ashcroft (R-MO)
suggested that the presence of a gay school-
teacher would disrupt the development of young
men who may be "unsure about themselves when
they are in transition . . .and [when] they move
from boyhood to manhood."5 According to Sena-
tor Ashcroft, the years from adolescence into
adulthood "are critical times when role 'models
are very important."6  He said: "[I]n hiring
schoolteachers, or camp counselors, or those who
deal with young people, you never just hire a
teacher. You are always hiring more than a
teacher. You are hiring a role model."
7
Referring to ENDA, Senator Ashcroft said, "I do
not think [this] is the right signal to send to the
next generation.""
Sharing Senator Ashcroft's sentiments, Senator
Don Nickles (R-OK) suggested that ENDA would
- John E. Yang, Senate Passes Bill Against Same-Sex Marriage,
WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 1996, at Al.
4 Although ENDA would cover teachers in public as well
as non-religious, private schools, the Constitutional rights of
public schoolteachers differ significantly from those of pri-
vate schoolteachers. Because of length considerations, this
article will address the rights of public schoolteachers alone.
The term "schoolteacher" in this article is meant to encom-
pass not only the traditional classroom instructors, but also
coaches, guidance counselors, teacher's aides, and other
school personnel directly responsible for the education and
development of students.
5 142 CONG. REc. S9986, S10,000 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 1996)





enable gay and lesbian schoolteachers to prosely-
tize in the classroom, and that the bill would pro-
hibit local school boards from controlling in-class-
room speech. Equating homosexuality with
promiscuity, he posited:
What about a school board making decisions.., in Ala-
bama where maybe this small community says we do
not think we should have avowed open homosexual
leaders, gay activists, as teachers in the fifth grade? ... I
would urge our colleagues to think about if school
boards... really find promiscuous conduct unaccept-
able, and such persons engaging in such conduct not
the right type of role models they would like to have for
their young people they would be subject to suit under
ENDA.9
Yet another Senator took the question of the
regulation of gay schoolteachers' expression fur-
ther, warning that ENDA would illegitimately pre-
vent school administrators from disciplining gay
and lesbian teachers on the basis of same-sex pub-
lic displays of affection ("PDAs"):
[S]uppose a single male teacher, during nonschool
hours and in public, holds hands, walks arm in arm
with his girlfriend, and engages in some kissing. I can
well understand if the school authorities do not find
that public behavior a matter for discipline. Under this
bill, however, these same school authorities could not
take action against a male teacher who engages in the
very same public actions Ijtust mentioned, with another
male. I think that forcing [a school board] to treat
both situations the same, in terms of role models for
schoolchildren and the other concerns parents and ed-
ucators might have, is wrong.
10
In arguing that school boards should have the
power to discriminate against gay men and lesbi-
ans as per se bad role models, several Senators re-
ferred to the case of Jeffrey Bruton (a.k.a. "Ty
Fox"), a married middle school teacher and
coach in suburban Virginia who resigned and sur-
rendered his teaching license after it was discov-
ered that he led a double life as a gay porno-
graphic video star.'1 Senator Nickles warned that
if ENDA were passed and a school board sought
to discharge a gay teacher on the grounds that he
or she appeared in a pornographic film, "[t]hey
can be sued, under this legislation, not only for
compensatory damages, but [also] for punitive
damages."' 
2
This article discusses how these arguments mis-
characterize ENDA's scope, overlook well-settled
9 142 CONG. REc. S10,066 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1996) (state-
ment of Sen. Nickles).
10 142 CONG. REC S9986, S9993 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 1996)
(statement of Sen. Hatch).
11 See, e.g., 142 CONG. REc S9986, S10,000 (daily ed.
Sept., 6, 1996) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft); 142 CONG. REC
constitutional principles delimiting the First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights of public school-
teachers, and evidence a lack of understanding of
the nature of homosexuality and the current state
of affairs of lesbian and gay teachers in the public
schools. In the first half of this article, I will de-
scribe ENDA, then analyze the history of the treat-
ment of schoolteachers as moral exemplars. I will
provide a brief history of the discrimination that
lesbian and gay teachers face, showing how the
Senators' opposition to gay and lesbian teachers
on the basis of vague notions of morality is
neither new nor rare, and will then discuss how
sexual orientation is not a valid factor in deter-
mining whether an individual would make a good
role model or schoolteacher. In particular, I will
demonstrate how recent interpretations of the
Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal
protection guarantees would prohibit school ad-
ministrators from categorically excluding gay and
lesbian people from teacher positions, as Senators
Ashcroft and Nickles contemplate.
In the second half of this article, I will examine
the Senators' assumptions concerning the effects
of ENDA on the free speech rights of public
schoolteachers, demonstrating particularly how
ENDA would not affect the ability of school
boards and school administrators to regulate the
in-classroom speech of gay and lesbian teachers,
including school officials' legitimate abilities to
prohibit "proselytizing" and "activism" inside the
classroom. I will also demonstrate how ENDA's
opponents' contention that ENDA would prohibit
school administrators from disciplining gay teach-
ers for same-sex PDAs again begs the question of
whether school administrators have that authority
absent ENDA. The First Amendment's free ex-
pression guarantees, and relevant caselaw, suggest
that they do not.
II. THE EMPLOYMENT NON-
DISCRIMINATION ACT OF 1997
For the great majority of gay and lesbian Ameri-
cans, no effective legal recourse exists against em-
S10129, S10132 (daily ed. Sept, 10, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Hatch); 142 CONG. RFc S10,129, S10,135 (daily ed. Sept, 10,
1996) (statement of Sen. Nickles). See also Loudon Teacher
Quits Over Porn Video Role, WAsH. TiMES,July 27, 1996, at All.
12 142 CONG. REC S10129, S10134 (daily ed. Sept. 10,
1996) (statement of Sen. Nickles).
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ployment discrimination based on sexual orienta-
tion. Current federal anti-discrimination law
prohibits employment discrimination on the basis
of race, religion, national origin, sex (gender),
age, and disability, 13 but not sexual orientation.
Attempts to assert that sexual orientation discrimi-
nation constitutes sex discrimination proscribed
by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,14 the
primary federal law prohibiting employment dis-
crimination, have failed.' 5 Moreover, although
eleven states and the District of Columbia, as well
as more than 100 local jurisdictions, have enacted
13 Section 703 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994), prohibits employment discrimi-
nation on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. Section 4(a) of the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a) (1994), prohibits em-
ployment discrimination on the basis of age. Section 102 of
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112 (1994), prohibits employment discrimination on the
basis of disability. Additional statutes prohibit discrimination
by entities receiving federal funding. Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (1995), prohibits
discrimination on the basis of race, color, and religion. Sec-
tion 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)
(1995), prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability by
such entities. Section 303 of the Age Discrimination Act of
1975, 42 U.S.C. § 6102 (1995), prohibits discrimination on
the basis of age by such entities. Section 901 of Title IX of
the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)
(1995), prohibits discrimination based on sex in educational
institutions that receive such funds.
14 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (prohibiting discrimination on
the basis of race, color, religion, sex and national origin).
15 See, e.g., Dillon v. Frank, 58 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH)
para. 41,332, at 70,107 (6th Cir. 1992) (ruling against postal
worker who brought sexual orientation discrimination claim
under Title VII. The court concluded that the postal
worker's coworkers' actions were all directed at demeaning
him solely because they disapproved vehemently of his al-
leged homosexuality. "These actions, although cruel, are not
made illegal by Title VII."); Williamson v. A.G. Edwards and
Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) ("Ti-
tle VII does not prohibit discrimination against homosexu-
als."); DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329-30
(9th Cir. 1979) ("[W]e conclude that Title VII's prohibition
of 'sex' discrimination applies only to discrimination on the
basis of gender and should not be judicially extended to in-
clude sexual preference such as homosexuality.") (footnote
omitted) (following Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 566
F.2d 659, 664 (9th Cir. 1977)).
16 See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.1 (West Supp. 1997); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46a-81 (c) (West 1995); D.C. CODE §§ 1-
2501 to 1-2557 (Michie 1991 and Supp. 1997); HAW. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 378-2 (Michie Supp. 1996); MAsS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 151B, § 4 (West 1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03
(West Supp. 1997); 1997 N.H. LAWS 108 (effective Jan. 1,
1998); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West 1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§§ 11-24-2-11-24-2.2, 28-5-3, 28-5-5, 28-5-7 (1995 & Supp.
1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495 (Supp. 1997); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 111.36 (West 1997). All ten jurisdictions prohibit dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual orientation in employment
legislation proscribing sexual orientation discrim-
ination in employment, 16 the rest of America of-
fers no such protection.
Although the types of discrimination afflicting
gay and lesbian Americans have evolved with
changes in economic and social dynamics, 17 it re-
mains true that today the gay and lesbian commu-
nity is among the most discriminated against mi-
nority groups in the nation. Not only do gay
people suffer from rampant employment discrimi-
nation,18 they also face more life-threatening
and all but California extend this protection to housing.
Minnesota and Wisconsin also outlaw sexual orientation dis-
crimination in public and private education. In Maine, the
effectiveness of a non-discrimination statute prohibiting sex-
ual orientation discrimination in employment, housing, and
public accommodations that was enacted in May 1997 was
put on hold pending a successful February 10, 1998 referen-
dum which repealed the law. See 1997 ME. LAwS 205; see also
Maine's Gay-Rights Law Loses Court Fight, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov.
23, 1997, at B5; Ballot Sites Added in Gay-Rights Vote, BOSTON
GLOBE, Jan. 4, 1998, at B3; Carey Goldberg, Maine Voters Re-
peal Law Banning Gay Bias, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1998, at Al,
A33. For information on local jurisdictions that afford pro-
tection against discrimination based on sexual orientation,
see Human Rights Campaign, State, Cities and Counties Which
Prohibit Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation (visited Jan.
27, 1998) <http://www.hrc.org/issues/workplac/nd/
ndjuris.html>; Note, Constitutional Limits on Anti-Gay-Rights In-
itiatives, 106 HARV. L.R. 1905, 1923-25 (1993); William N. Es-
kridge, Jr., Challenging the Apartheid of the Closet: Establishing
Conditions for Lesbian and Gay Intimacy, Nomos, and Citizenship,
1961-1981, 25 HOFSTRA L.R. 817, 925-28, 970 (1997) (provid-
ing numerous examples of anti-discrimination protections af-
forded by local jurisdictions.
17 SeeJoFtN D'EMILIO & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE
MATTERS: A HISTORY OF SEXUALITY IN AMERICA, 226-27, 288
(1988); Patricia A. Cain, Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights:
A Legal History, 79 VA. L. REv. 1551, 1564-67 (1993); see also
Developments in the Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law, HARV.
L. REv. 1508 (1989) (discussing the history of discrimination
against gay and lesbian Americans in public and private em-
ployment).
18 Twenty surveys conducted across the nation between
1980 and 1991 demonstrated that between 16 and 44% of gay
men and lesbians had experienced workplace discrimination.
See Employment Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation:
Hearings on S. 2238 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and
Human Resources, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 70 (1994) (statement
of Anthony P. Carnevale, Chair, National Commission for
Employment Policy); see also The Employment Non-Discrimina-
tion Act: Hearing on H.R. 1863 Before the Subcomm. on Gov't Pro-
grams of the House Comm. on Small Bus., 104th Cong. 181-228
(1996) (statement of Chai R. Feldblum, Associate Professor
of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, Appendix I
(Summary of Reported Sexual Orientation Cases Before Fed-
eral and State Courts), Appendix II (Tabulation of Com-
plaints Filed in Six States with Sexual Orientation Laws as of
1994) and Appendix III (Documented Cases ofJob Discrimi-




forms of bias, such as violent hate crimes.1"
Patterned after Title VII, ENDA provides that a
"covered entity" cannot, with respect to employ-
ment or an employment opportunity, subject an
individual to different standards or treatment, or
otherwise discriminate against the individual, on
the basis of the individual's real or perceived sex-
ual orientation or that of a person with whom the
individual is believed to associate.
20
The term "covered entity" includes most federal
and state employers2' as well as private employers.
Private employers that are covered are those enti-
ties "engaged in an industry affecting commerce,"
as defined in Section 701 (h) of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,22 that have 15 or more employees.
23
ENDA does not apply to the armed forces24 nor to
religious organizations, except regarding employ-
ment in a position whose duties are dedicated
solely to generating unrelated business income
subject to Federal taxation.25 Moreover, ENDA
would not apply to the provision of employee
spousal benefits, 26 explicitly prohibits quotas or
any preferential treatment on the basis of sexual
orientation, 27 prohibits the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission from collecting statistics
19 See HATE CRIMES: CONFRONTING VIOLENCE AGAINST LES-
BIANS AND GAY MEN 7 (Gregory M. Herek & Kevin T. Berrill
eds., 1992) (noting that gay people appear to be one of the
most frequent victims of hate crimes); see also U.S. DEP'T OF
JUST., FED'L BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, HATE CRIME STATIS-
TICS 1996 7 tbl.1 Uan. 8, 1998) (stating that the FBI received
reports of 1,016 crimes in 1996 targeting people because of
their sexual orientation, representing 11.5 percent of the to-
tal 8,759 bias-motivated incidents reported to the FBI for that
period. Following a 1993 study on hate crimes, the Los Ange-
les County Commission on Human Relations reported that
in 1993 gay men had replaced African Americans as the lead-
ing target of hate crimes, having been targeted in 27 percent
of the 783 hate crimes documented by law enforcement
agencies and community organizations. Errol A. Cockfield,
Jr., Crimes of Bias, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1995, at B1.
20 See ENDA, S. 869 § 4, H.R. 1858 § 4.
21 See id. § 3 (including government employers encom-
passed by section 717(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a), section 302(a)(1) of the Government
Employee Rights Act of 1991, 2 U.S.C. § 1202(1), or the Con-
gressional Accountability Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C.A. § 1301
(West 1997).
22 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(h) (1994).
23 See Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 1997, S.
869 § 3(3).
24 See id. § 10(a)(1).
25 See id. § 9.
26 See id. § 6.
27 See id. § 8.
on sexual orientation from covered entities, and
affirmatively disallows disparate impact claims
based on a prima facie violation of the statute.2
8
ENDA has earned widescale support. As of Au-
gust 28, 1997, ENDA had thirty-five Senate co-
sponsors and 148 House co-sponsors. 29 President
Clinton has endorsed ENDA and has committed
to sign it into law if passed by Congress.30 Dozens
of major corporations including Apple Computer,
AT&T, Bell Atlantic, Bethlehem Steel, Eastman
Kodak, Honeywell, Merrill Lynch, Microsoft,
Quaker Oats, RJR Nabisco, and Xerox have en-
dorsed the bill for passage. 31 A large number of
church groups and non-profit organizations also
have endorsed ENDA.32 Major civil rights figures,
such as Coretta Scott King, have endorsed
ENDA,-"13 as has former conservative Republican
Senator Barry Goldwater, who reasoned that
"[e]mployment discrimination based on sexual
orientation is a real problem in our society. From
coast to coast and throughout the heartland, reg-
ular hardworking Americans are being denied the
right to roll up their sleeves and earn a living.
That is just plain wrong."34
28 See id. § 7.
29 See Human Rights Campaign, 105th Congress Current
Cosponsors of the Employment Non-Discrimination Act (visited Jan.
27, 1998) <http://www.hrc.org/issues/leg/enda/en-
dacs.html>.
30 See Clinton Backs Bill to Bar Job Bias Against Gays, Ci.
TRIB., Oct. 21, 1995, at 8N.
"I See Human Rights Campaign, Corporations Endorsing the
Employment Non-discrimination Act (ENDA) (visited Jan. 27,
1998) <http://www.hrc.org/issues/workplac/enda/en-
dacorp.html>.
32 The American Jewish Committee, the Episcopal
Church, the Evangelical Lutheran Church, the Presbyterian
Church (USA), the Union of American Hebrew Congrega-
tions, and the United Methodist Church, among others, have
endorsed ENDA. See Human Rights Campaign, Churches and
Religious Organizations Endorsing the Employment Non-Discrimi-
nation Act (ENDA) (visited Jan. 27, 1998) <http://
www.hrc.org/issues/leg/enda/endarel.html>. The Ameri-
can Bar Association, the American Nurses Association, the
American Psychological Association, the AFL-CIO, the Na-
tional Women's Law Center, and People For the American
Way, among others, have endorsed ENDA. See Human
Rights Campaign, Organizations Endorsing the Employment Non-
Discrimination Act (ENDA) (visited Jan. 27, 1998) <http://
www.hrc.org/issues/leg/enda/endaorg.html>.
-13 See 142 CONG. REC S9987 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 1996)
(statement of Sen. Kennedy).
34 Id.
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III. SEXUAL ORIENTATION IS NOT
DETERMINATIVE OF WHETHER A
TEACHER IS A GOOD ROLE MODEL OR
A GOOD EDUCATOR
Those Senators who opposed ENDA were cor-
rect in asserting that public schoolteachers are se-
lected for characteristics that render them good
educators as well as good role models for stu-
dents. They are incorrect, however, in suggesting
that gay and lesbian people are a bad influence
on youth and thus should be excluded categori-
cally from teaching positions. Such a suggestion
belies the nature of homosexuality and the suc-
cessful, longstanding presence of lesbian and gay
teachers in the nation's schools.
A. Schoolteachers as Moral Exemplars
As a consequence of their responsibility for the
intellectual and moral development of children,
schoolteachers are held to a high code of per-
sonal and professional conduct.35 Courts have ac-
corded parents the right to expect that those who
are entrusted with the education of their children
possess innate virtue and morality, as defined by
the attitudes and sensibilities of the community.36
In 1790, Noah Webster contended that "the only
practicable method to reform mankind, is to be-
gin with children; to banish, if possible, from their
company, every low bred, drunken, immoral char-
acter .... The great art of correcting mankind
therefore, consists in prepossessing the mind with
good principles.
' ' 37
In its 1952 Adler v. Board of Education38 decision,
the Supreme Court echoed Webster's sentiments:
35 See Pettit v. State Bd. of Educ., 513 P.2d 889, 894 (Cal.
1973) (en banc); Board of Trustees v. Hartman, 55 Cal. Rep.
144, 148 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966); Governing Bd. of Mountain
View Sch. Dist. v. Metcalf, 36 Cal. Rep. 724, 727 (Cal. Ct. App.
1974).
36 See, e.g., Tingley v. Vaughn, 17 Ill. App. 347, 350-51
(1885); Schwer's Appeal, 36 Pa. D. & C. 531, 533 (1939)
(finding that a teacher who failed to "command the respect
nor good will of the community" could be deemed incompe-
tent); see also Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589
(1967) (invalidating statute requiring public university
professors to sign national loyalty pledge).
37 NOAH WEBSTER, A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS AND FUGITIVE
WRITINGS (1790) quoted in KAREN M. HARBECK, GAY AND LES-
BIAN EDUCATORS: PERSONAL FREEDOMS, PUBLIC CONSTRAINTS,
113-14 (1997).
38 342 U.S. 485 affd per curiam sub nom., L'Hommedieu v.
Board of Regents, 342 U.S. 951 (1952), and overruled in part
by Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
"A teacher works in a sensitive area in a school-
room. . . .That the school authorities have the
right and the duty to screen the officials, teachers,
and employees as to their fitness to maintain the
integrity of the school as part of ordered society,
cannot be doubted."
39
Because standards for the selection and govern-
ance of teachers traditionally are set by local
elected officials, these standards more often than
not reflect the social mores of the local commu-
nity. It is not surprising, therefore, that at times
the conduct proscribed by local school adminis-
trators has included public smoking, drinking,
dancing, theater going, loitering, and even auto-
mobile rides on weekday nights and leaving town
without the school board chairman's permis-
sion.
4 0
Having local politicians prescribe standards for
the selection and promotion of teachers has rati-
fied unjust social biases, under the guise of vague
iterations of morality, as criteria for identifying
good teachers. For example, individuals per-
ceived to be Communists, 41 spouses in mixed-race
marriages, 42 and pregnant women 43 at one time
were excluded from schoolteacher positions be-
cause the local community considered them im-
moral or a bad influence on children. The prac-
tice of applying majoritarian community
prejudices in schoolteacher employment deci-
sions is by no means a uniquely American phe-
nomenon. In the mid-1930s, Jewish public teach-
ers in Germany were fired from theirjobs because
Jews were perceived as per se immoral and poor
role models for children.
44
Because gays and lesbians throughout history
39 Id. at 493.
40 See DAVID RUBIN, THE RIGHTS OF TEACHERS 108-09
(1971).
41 See HARBECK, supra note 37, at 179-86; see also Beilan v.
Board of Pub. Education, 357 U.S. 399 (1958) (holding that
public schoolteacher's discharge did not violate the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause where teacher re-
fused to answer school superintendent's question concerning
teacher's Communist party affiliation and such refusal consti-
tted "incompetency" within Pennsylvania public school
code provision that made incompetency a ground for dis-
charge).
42 See, e.g., Clark v. Louisa County Sch. Bd., 472 F. Supp.
321 (E.D. Va. 1979).
43 See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S.
632 (1974).
44 ERWIN J. HAEBERLE, Swastika, Pink Triangle and Yellow
Star: The Destruction of Sexology and the Persecution of Homosexu-
als in Nazi Germany, in HIDDEN FROM HISTORY: RECLAIMING
19981
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have been discriminated against on the basis of
the majoritarian view that homosexuality is per se
immoral, 4 5 it is not surprising that lesbian and gay
teachers have been discriminated against in
schoolteacher positions. As described in the fol-
lowing section, the emergence of organized gay
communities and a gay "identity" over the past
half century has mobilized anti-gay forces that
have rallied against equal rights for lesbians and
gay men. Most often, these political attacks-sim-
ilar to those used in the 1996 ENDA floor de-
bates-have relied upon distorted images of lesbi-
ans and gays in the politically charged public
school setting as a means to quickly incite public
opposition to ENDA-like equal rights legislation.
B. A Brief History of the Treatment of Gay and
Lesbian Teachers As Per Se Immoral
1. The Emergence and Vilification of a Gay Identity
In the United States, government-sanctioned
and overt discrimination against gay men and les-
bians became most prevalent following the emer-
gence of gay and lesbian communities and a dis-
tinct "gay identity. " 46 Whereas society had long
since treated homosexuality as a vilified behavior, the
emergence of a gay identity acquainted the world
with homosexuals-individuals who comprised a
culture that evidenced characteristics and motiva-
tions unrelated to particular sexual practices.47
The birth of gay and lesbian communities also
gave rise to opportunities for the government (in-
THE GAY AND LESBIAN PAST 370 (Martin B. Duberman et al.
eds., 1990).
45 See John D'Emilio, Making and Unmaking Minorities:
The Tensions Between Gay Politics and History, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& Soc. CHANGE 915, 917 (1986); Anne B. Goldstein, History,
Homosexuality, and Political Values: Searching for the Hidden De-
terminants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L.J. 1073, 1087
(1988); see generallyJOHN BOSWELL, CHRISTIANITv, SOCIAL TOL-
ERANCE, AND HOMOSEXUALITY: GAY PEOPLE IN WESTERN Eu-
ROPE FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA TO THE
FOURTEENTH CENTURY (1980).
46 See Chai R. Feldblum, Sexual Orientation, Morality,
and the Law: Devlin Revisited, 57 U. PIrr. L. REv. 237, 272
(1996) (citing D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 17, at 226-
27.) See also JOIIN D'EMILIO, Capitalism and Gay Identity, in
SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW 46, 47 (William B. Ruben-
stein, ed., 2d ed. 1997) (tracing the emergence of a gay iden-
tity). D'Emilio disagrees with the notion that gay people
have existed forever. He posits that gay men and lesbians:
are a product of history .... [l]t has been the historical
development of capitalism-more specifically, its free la-
bor system-that has allowed large numbers of men and
women in the late twentieth century to call themselves
cluding law enforcement officers) to single-out
and harass gay people, thereby setting the norm
for the treatment of homosexuals by private em-
ployers, landlords, and other private actors .
4
This governmental repression of the emerging
gay and lesbian identity originated at the highest
levels. For example, in 1950, the Senate Investiga-
tions Subcommittee was instructed "to make an
investigation into the employment by the Govern-
ment of homosexuals and other sex perverts," and
concluded that homosexuals were unqualified for
government employment because they "lack emo-
tional stability of normal persons.
'" 4 9
Such blatant acts of bigotry against gay people
provoked lesbians and gay men to become politi-
cally organized in order to wrest equal rights from
their local and state governments.50 At times, nas-
cent gay political organizations were successful in
advocating passage of gay civil rights ordinances.
5'
Such hard-won civil rights protections, however,
came at a price.
2. The Anti-Gay Backlash
The passage of early gay and lesbian civil rights
ordinances engendered a backlash from conserva-
tive activists who rallied support for the repeal of
these laws by advancing arguments concerning
gay and lesbian teachers similar to those articu-
lated by those Senators who vocally opposed
ENDA. In the late 1970s, then-popular enter-
tainer Anita Bryant sought to rid Miami schools of
gay, to see themselves as part of a community of similar
men and women, and to organize politically on the basis
of that identity.
Id.
47 SeeJOHN D'EMILIO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMU-
NITIES: THE MAKING OF A HOMOSEXUAL MINORITY IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1940-1970 9-39 (1983) (positing that the ur-
banization of the United States led to the creation of lesbian
and gay enclaves in major cities that in turn facilitated the
development of lesbian and gay minority communities and
identities).
48 Patricia Cain, Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights: A
Legal History, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1551, 1565 (1993).
49 Id. at 1565-66 (quoting SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS
OF THE COMM. ON EXPENDITURE IN THE EXECUTIVE DEP'TS.,
EMPLOYMENT OF HOMOSEXUALS AND OTHER SEX PERVERTS IN
GOVERNMENT, INTERIM REPORT, S. Doc. No. 241, 81st Cong.,
2d Sess. 4 (1950)).
50 See Developments in the Law-Sexual Orientation and the
Law, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1508, 1515-16 (1989).
51 See State and Local Laws, in RUBENSTEIN, supra note 46,
at 468-73.
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"deviant" influences by laboring successfully to re-
peal a Dade County, Florida ordinance support-
ing gay and lesbian housing and employment pro-
tections. 52 Contending that "I'd rather my child
be dead than be a homosexual," 53 Bryant cru-
saded against the ordinance with zeal, advocating
that "Homosexuality is a sin, and if homosexuals
were given carte blanche to glamorize their 'devi-
ant lifestyle' in Miami-area classrooms, the Ameri-
can family would be destroyed and the American
way of life would disappear."
54
Bryant contended that in Los Angeles alone,
30,000 students under the age of 12 were being
"recruited and sexually abused by homosexu-
als." 55 Bryant invoked the "role model" argument
much in the same way that the argument was used
during the 1996 ENDA Senate floor debate: "Un-
less repealed, the ordinance will allow homosexu-
als.., to provide 'role models' for the impression-
able . . . . This recruitment of our children is
absolutely necessary for the survival and growth of
homosexuality-for since homosexuals cannot
reproduce, they must recruit, must freshen their
ranks. "56
In the end, Bryant's efforts, although perceived
as irrational by many, prevailed. On June 7, 1977,
Dade County voters repealed the housing and em-
ployment anti-discrimination ordinance by a vote
52 See Bill Peterson, Gay Rights Law Loses 2-1 in Miami,
WASH. POST, June 8, 1977, at Al. Civil rights activists still
have not been able to have this ordinance re-enacted.
53 Millie Ball, I'd Rather My Child Be Dead Than Homo, THE
TIMES-PICAYUNE, June 19, 1977, at 3.
54 Ken Kelley, "Cruising with Anita," Playboy (May 1978),
at 75.
55 Harbeck, supra note 37, at 49 (quoting Kay Zahasky,
Anita Bryant: Exclusive Interview, TODAY'S STUDENT, Feb. 6,
1978). Bryant warned that the "'national goals' of the 'ho-
mosexual conspiracy' were to overturn age of consent laws
and acquire 'special legal privileges'" in order to recruit
schoolchildren. Id. (quoting Zahasky, supra).
56 ANITA BRYANT, THE ANITA BRYANT STORY 146 (1977)
reprinted in RUBENSTEIN, supra note 46, at 475, 476.
57 See Peterson, supra note 52, at Al. That same year,
Good Housekeeping magazine named Anita Bryant the "most
popular woman in America," based on a national readers
poll. Harbeck, supra note 37, at 53 (quoting Zahasky, supra
note 55).
58 Kristina Campbell & Lyn Stoesen, 19 Years of Ballot Bat-
tles, WASti. BLADE, Nov. 12, 1993, at 14; see also Note, Constitu-
tional Limits on Anti-Gay Rights Initiatives, 106 HARV. L. REv.
1905, 1908 (1993). Anita Bryant reprised her earlier success
in Florida by persuading Oklahoma legislators to have the
Briggs Initiative language enacted on April 6, 1978. The
Oklahoma statutory provision, however, was later overturned
by the 10th Circuit as overbroad because it punished pro-
tected, out-of-classroom speech. See National Gay Task Force
of 69 percent to 31 percent with over 30,000 citi-
zens casting their votes.
57
Bryant's formula was replicated in other states,
such as Minnesota, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Ore-
gon.58 In California, a ballot referendum known
as the Briggs Initiative or "Proposition 6," intro-
duced in June 1977 by State Senator John Briggs
(R-Fullerton) sought to "rid schools of homosex-
ual teachers"'59 ,by permitting the firing of any
public school employee who engaged in "advocat-
ing, soliciting, imposing, encouraging or promot-
ing [ ]private or public homosexual activity."60
The Briggs Initiative was defeated in California on
November 7, 1978.61
In Oklahoma, Anita Bryant reprised her earlier
success in Florida by persuading Oklahoma legis-
lators to have the Briggs Initiative language en-
acted (as what was referred to as "Helm's Bill" af-
ter its sponsor, Oklahoma State Senator Mary
Helm) on April 6, 1978. The Oklahoma statutory
provision, however, was later overturned by the
10th Circuit Court of Appeals as overbroad be-
cause it punished protected, out-of-classroom
speech. 62 Similar attempts to pass initiatives to re-
peal employment non-discrimination statutes pro-
tecting gay and lesbian employees persist to this
day.
63
v. Board of Educ., 729 F.2d 1270, 1274 (10th Cir. 1984), afj'd
470 U.S. 903 (1985) (per curiam).
59 See The Pride Legal Defense Fund, Proposition Six,
(1978), cited in HARBECK, supra note 37, at 63.
60 Nan D. Hunter, Speech, Identity and Equality, 79 VA. L.
REv. 1695, 1703 (1993) (citing California Proposition 6,
§ 3(b)(2) (1978)). The Briggs Initiative would have
amended the California State Education Code with language
including the following:
As a result of continued close and prolonged contact
with schoolchildren, a teacher, teacher's aide, school ad-
ministrator or counselor becomes a role model whose
words, behavior and actions are likely to be emulated by
students coming under his or her care .... For these
reasons the state finds a compelling interest in refusing
to employ and in terminating the employment of a
schoolteacher, a teacher's aide, a school administrator
or a counselor, subject to reasonable restrictions and
qualifications, who engages in public homosexual activ-
ity and/or public homosexual conduct....
California Proposition 6, § 1 (1978), reprinted in HARBECK,
supra note 37, at app. B.
61 See Andrea Pearldaughter, Employment Discrimination
Against Lesbians: Municipal Ordinances and Other Remedies, 8
WOMEN'S L.F. 538, 553 (1979), cited in HARBECK, supra note
37, at 81.
62 See National Gay Task Force, 729 F.2d at 1274.
63 In 1992, citizens of Colorado passed a referendum
that resulted in "Amendment 2" to the Colorado Constitu-
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3. Gaylord v. Tacoma School District No. 10
The impact of anti-gay activism in the 1970's
did not spare the courts. Like some legislatures, a
number of courts succumbed to majoritarian
prejudices by finding that gay and lesbian people
are per se immoral and thus unqualified to hold
teachingjobs. In 1977, at the height of Anita Bry-
ant's crusade against gay and lesbian equal rights,
the Supreme Court of Washington, in Gaylord v.
Tacoma School District No. 10,64 upheld the dismis-
sal of James Gaylord, a well-respected and exper-
ienced public high school teacher, solely on the
grounds that he admitted he was gay.6 5 The
school board's written policies required holders
of teaching certificates to be persons "of good
moral character," and provided that "immorality"
is sufficient grounds for discharge.66 A student
who had sought Gaylord's advice on an academic
matter told the school principal that, from his dis-
cussion, he believed that Gaylord was gay. When
the principal conferred with Gaylord, Gaylord
confirmed his homosexuality. Less than one
month later, Gaylord was notified that the Ta-
coma School Board had probable cause for his
discharge due to his homosexuality, and a short
time after that, he was discharged.
67
In equating homosexuality with immorality, the
court resorted to quoting the New Catholic Encyclo-
pedia, noting that it characterizes homosexuality
as immoral.68 The court also found dispositive
that "[h] omosexuality is widely condemned as im-
moral and was so condemned as immoral during
biblical times."6 1 Having concluded that homo-
sexuality is inherently immoral, the court held,
tion, which prohibited government entities from enforcing
or enacting any action that would protect individuals from
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. COLO.
CONST. art. II, § 30(b). In 1993, Porstmouth, New Hamp-
shire voters barred "protected" legal status for gay men and
lesbians, and voters in Cincinnati, Ohio endorsed an initia-
tive to rescind and ban statutory protections for gay and les-
bian citizens, patterned after the Colorado Amendment 2
language. See generally Equality Found. v. City of Cincinnati,
54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995), vacated and remanded for further
consideration in light of Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 2519 (1996)
(mem.); The 1993 Elections: Propositions, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 3,
1993, at A24. All of these statutes were invalidated by the
Supreme Court's Romer v. Evans decision. 116 S. Ct. 1620
(1996). In Romer, the Supreme Court held that Amendment
2 to the Colorado constitution failed to further a proper leg-
islative end and violated the Equal Protection clause insofar
as it prohibited an entire class of citizens, i.e., gays and lesbi-
ans, from seeking the aid of their government to redress
wrongs. See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1629.
without any actual evidence, that Gaylord's re-
maining on the school's faculty would have been
unacceptably disruptive.
7 0
C. Gays and Lesbians Are Just As Likely As
Heterosexuals To Serve As Excellent
Teachers and Role Models
1. Dispelling the "Recruitment" and "Molestation"
Myths
Implicit in the views of the Gaylord court and
the anti-gay activists who backed the Briggs and
Dade County initiatives was the misconception
that the very presence of these gay men and lesbi-
ans as authority figures in the lives of students
might in some way have the effect of "recruiting"
these young people "into" homosexuality. Also
implicit in these views is the belief that gay and
lesbian people have a tendency to be pedophiles
and thus must be kept away from children. The
Senators' statements in opposition to ENDA cited
above quite clearly echo these longstanding senti-
ments.
a. The Nature of Sexual Orientation
The notion that gay people recruit and prosely-
tize, or even worse, molest youth more often than
heterosexuals is squarely disproved by hard statis-
tics and by the evolving social and scientific un-
derstanding concerning the nature of homosexu-
ality. Gay people are no more likely-and actually
may be less likely-to molest children than are
heterosexuals. 7' Moreover, children exposed to
64 559 P.2d 1340 (Wash. 1977) (en banc). See also Row-
land v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 730 F.2d 444, 451 (6th Cir.
1984) (upholding dismissal of public school counselor for
mentioning her lesbianism to colleague at school).
65 Gaylord, 559 P.2d at 1347.
66 See id. at 1342.
67 See id.
68 See id. at 1343.
69 Id. at 1345.
70 See id. at 1347.
71 See Gregory M. Herek, Myths About Sexual Orientation: A
Lawyer's Guide to Social Science Research, 1 L. & SEXUALITY 133,
152-56 (1991); CaroleJenny, et al., Are Children at Risk for Sex-
ual Abuse by Homosexuals?, 94 PEDIATRICS 41, 41 (1994) (find-
ing that records in a child sexual abuse clinic revealed that
children were far more likely to be abused by the heterosex-
ual partner of a close relative than by a gay or lesbian per-
son); Judd Marmor, Clinical Aspects of Male Homosexuality, in
HOMOSEXUAL BEIIAVIOR: A MODERN REAPPRAISAL, 271 (Judd
Marmor ed. 1980).
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gay and lesbian role models are no more predis-
posed to "becoming" homosexuals than children
exposed to few or no gay and lesbian influences.
One researcher, in fact, discovered that of thirty-
seven children raised by same-sex parents, thirty-
six of the children grew up to be heterosexual. 7
2
If sexual orientation could "rub off' as easily as
some of ENDA's Senate opponents suggest it
does, then presumably all children of heterosexu-
als would grow up to be heterosexuals. Ronald
Reagan made an eloquent attempt to dispel this
myth in a public statement opposing California's
Briggs Initiative in 1978:
As to the role model argument, a woman writing to the
editor of a Southern California newspaper said it-all: 'If
teachers had such power over children, I would have
been a nun years ago.' Whatever else it is, homosexual-
ity is not a contagious disease like the measles. Prevail-
ing scientific opinion is that an individual's sexuality is
determined at a very early age and that a child's teach-
ers do not really influence this.
7 3
Although the scientific community has not
reached agreement on whether homosexuality is
a genetic trait, it has reached a broadbased con-
sensus on the proposition that a person's sexual
orientation, whether heterosexual or homosex-
ual, is fixed and generally is not subject to con-
scious change.74 No doubt, this growing under-
standing of the nature of homosexuality was
precipitated by gay and lesbian people asserting
72 See Richard Green, M.D., Sexual Identity of 37 Children
Raised By Homosexual or Transsexual Parents, 135:6 AM. J. PSY-
CHIATRY 692-697 (June 1978); see also Jeanne J. Speizer, Role
Models, Mentors, and Sponsors: The Elusive Concepts. 6 (4) SIGNS:
J. WOMEN IN CULTURE & SoC'Y 692 (1981); see generally Rich-
ard Green, M.D., THE "Sissy BoY SYNDROME" AND THE DEVEL-
OPMENT OF HOMOSEXUALITY (1987).
73 RONNIE DUGGER, ON REAGAN, THE MAN AND HIS PRESI-
DENCY 264, 559 n.3 (1983).
74 See Chandler Burr, Homosexuality and Biology, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, March 1993, at 47 (summarizing scientific devel-
opments identifying possible genetic basis for homosexual
orientation); Gary Ramafedi, Homosexual Youth: A Challenge to
Contemporary Society, 258JAMA 222-23 (1987) (reporting that
most studies find sexual orientation well-established by early
childhood); see also Eli Coleman, Changing Approaches to the
Treatment of Homosexuality in HOMOSEXUALITY: SOCIAL, PSY-
CHOLOGICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL ISSUES, 81-88 (William Paul, et
al. eds. 1982); ALAN P. BELL, SEXUAL PREFERENCE-ITs DEVEL-
OPMENT IN MEN AND WOMEN, 166-67, 211, 222 (1981); N. Mc-
Conaghy, Is a Homosexual Orientation Irreversible?, 129 BRT. J.
PSYCHIATRY 556, 563 (1976); Frank X. Acosta, Etiology and
Treatment of Homosexuality: A Review, 4 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL
BEHAV. 9, 23-24 (1975); see generally C.A. TRIPP, THE HOMO-
SEXUAL MATRIX (1975); Michael W. Ross & Olli W. St.lstr6m,
Exorcism as Psychiatric Treatment: A Homosexual Case Study, 8
ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAV. 379, 379 (1979).
75 In 1973, the American Psychiatric Association re-
their identities. Now viewing homosexuality as an
innate characteristic, the mainstream scientific
community has revoked its traditional formula-
tion of homosexuality as disease.
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Facing the mounting scientific and social pres-
sures, churches have begun to moderate their
views on homosexuality. Perhaps the most strik-
ing example of this trend is the Roman Catholic
Church, which despite a history of deeming
homosexuals as per se immoral, has begun to man-
ifest a more conciliatory approach to the notion
that gay and lesbian people are entitled to full
religious, political, social, and familial en-
franchisement. In a remarkable pastoral message
from the National Conference of Catholic Bish-
ops U.S. Catholic Conference, the American Ro-
man Catholic Church leadership urged parents to
love and not reject their gay and lesbian children,
calling sexual orientation "a fundamental dimen-
sion of one's personality. ''76 In perhaps its most
groundbreaking statement, the U.S. Bishops clari-
fied that homosexual orientation alone cannot be
considered immoral: "[h]omosexual orientation
is experienced as a given, not as something freely
chosen. By itself, therefore, a homosexual orien-
tation cannot be considered sinful, for morality
presumes the freedom to choose."
77
Although weakened by its internal contradic-
moved homosexuality from the category of sociopathic per-
sonality disturbances in the DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS (DSM-II). See RONALD
BAYER, HOMOSEXUALITY AND AMERICAN PSYCHIATRY: THE POLI-
TICS OF DIAGNOSIS 129, 137 (1981). In 1985, the American
Psychological Association resolved that homosexual orienta-
tion "implies no impairment in judgment, stability, reliability
or general social or vocational capabilities." American Psy-
chological Association, Resolution (Jan. 1985), excerpted in
Jantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543, 1548 (D. Kan. 1991), rev'd
on other grounds 976 F.2d 623 (10th Cir. 1992).
76 Always Our Children: Pastoral Message to Parents of
Homosexual Children and Suggestions for Pastoral Minis-
ters, National Conference of Catholic Bishops Committee on
Marriage and Family, Sept. 10, 1997 [hereinafter Pastoral
Message] reprinted in 27 ORIGINS, CNS DOCUMENTARY SERVICE
285 (Oct. 9, 1997). See also Caryl Murphy, U.S. Catholic Bish-
ops Urge Acceptance of Gay Orientation, WASH. POST, Oct. 1,
1997, at Al, A18.
77 Pastoral Message, supra note 76, at 289 Although a wel-
come and encouraging sign of the Catholic Church's in-
creased understanding of the plight of gay and lesbian
Catholics, the Bishops' Letter advances a constricted exist-
ence for gay and lesbian Catholics who wish to live within the
Church's mandates. While the Bishops clarify that a homo-
sexual orientation alone cannot be considered sinful and im-
moral, they continue to assert that homosexual contact is im-
moral. See id. at 290. Thus, the only way for a gay or lesbian
19981
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
tion, 78 the Church's position undercuts the view
that gay and lesbian people are per se immoral
and, thus, a bad influence on children. In light of
the new scientific and religious understandings
concerning the origins and nature of homosexu-
ality, the attitudes and beliefs advanced by
ENDA's opponents in the Senate concerning
ENDA and teachers appear even more outdated
and anachronistic.
2. Role Models for Gay and Lesbian Youth
Not only are the Senators' comments based on
outdated perspectives on the nature of homosexu-
ality, they also incorrectly presuppose that there
are no gay or lesbian schoolchildren. Studies
have shown that sexual orientation is set in very
early childhood, perhaps even before birth. 79 Gay
and lesbian youth often face extreme difficulties
growing up. Unlike children in religious, racial,
or ethnic minority communities who are nurtured
and prepared by their families to face society's
prejudices and injustices, gay youth typically grow
up isolated in school, family, and community envi-
ronments that, more often than not, ostracize and
condemn gay people. The absence of positive gay
and lesbian role models further isolates these gay
youths and aggravates their already tormented ex-
istences.
Catholic to comply with the Church's moral code would be
to lead a chaste existence.
78 Although the Bishops acknowledge that gay and les-
bian people do not choose to be homosexual and thus can-
not be adjudged as per se immoral, they persist in deeming
homosexual sexuality (i.e., sexual activity by gay or lesbian
Catholics) as immoral and advocate a "chaste life" for gay
and lesbian Catholics. See id. at 290. In making this strained
status/conduct distinction, the Bishops fail to explain why
homosexual sexual orientation is not immoral in terms of sta-
tus and identity, but somehow becomes immoral when acted
upon.
79 See, e.g., Gary Remafedi, Homosexual Youth: A Challenge
to Contemporary Society, 258 JAMA 222, 223 (1987) (claiming
that most studies conclude that sexual orientation is well-es-
tablished by early childhood).
80 Quoted in Katherine A. O'Hanlan, et al., Homophobia is
a Health Hazard, USA TODAY MAG., Nov. 1996, at 26, 26-27.
See also A. Damien Martin & Emery S. Hetrick, The Stigmatiza-
tion of the Gay and Lesbian Adolescent, 15 J. HOMOSEXUALITY
163, 167 (1988) ("There is little or no opportunity for the
homosexually oriented adolescent to discover what it means
to be homosexual. Therefore, they cannot plan or some-
times even conceive of a future for themselves.").
81 Paul Gibson, Gay Male and Lesbian Youth Suicide, in
Report of the Secretary's Task Force on Youth Suicide 3-110,
3-128 (1989), cited in Nancy Tenney, The Constitutional Impera-
tive of Reality in Public School Curricula: Untruths About Homosex-
In 1993, the Committee on Adolescence of the
American Academy of Pediatrics determined that
in struggling to reconcile their sexual identities
with negative social pressures, gay and lesbian
youth confront a "lack of accurate knowledge, [a]
scarcity of positive role models, and an absence of
opportunity for open discussion. Such rejection
may lead to isolation, run-away behavior, home-
lessness, domestic violence, depression, suicide,
substance abuse, and school or job failure."' 0 In
1989, the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services released a study as part of the Report of
the Secretary of Health and Human Services Task
Force on Youth Suicide that concluded that "gay
youth are 2 to 3 times more likely to attempt sui-
cide than other young people . . . and may com-
prise up to 30 percent of completed youth sui-
cides annually.""'
The paucity of gay and lesbian role models in
schools harms not only gay students, but hetero-
sexual students as well, considering that all stu-
dents benefit significantly from their exposure to
reputable authority figures from differing reli-
gions, races, genders, ethnicities, and sexual ori-
entations.8 2 In fact, the shortage of gay and les-
bian role models in schools implicitly condones
homophobic attitudes and violence against those
students who identify themselves, or are identified
(whether accurately or not), as lesbian or gay.
3
uality as a Violation of the First Amendment, 60 BROOKLYN L. REV.
1599, 1613 n.63 (1995) (reporting that within months of the
Report's release, Dr. Louis W. Sullivan, Secretary of HHS
under President Bush, attacked the portion of the Report
that advocated ending discrimination against gay and lesbian
youth, stating "I am strongly committed to advancing tradi-
tional family values .... In my opinion, the views expressed in
the paper run contrary to that aim."). See also Joyce Mur-
doch, Gay Youths' Deadly Despair: High Rate of Suicide Attempts
Tracked, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 1988, at Al; Eve Kosofsky-
Sedgwick, How to Bring Your Kids Up Gay, 29 SOCIAL TEXT 18
(1991) (examining the experiences of gay and lesbian chil-
dren forced to undergo "reparative" therapy).
82 See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
Moreover, the Supreme Court has clarified that students
have a First Amendment right to receive information which
precludes school administrators from intentionally sup-
pressing access to ideas. See Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S.
853, 880 (1982); Keyishian v. Board of Educ., 385 U.S. 589,
603 ((quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp.
362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (Hand, J.) aff'd 326 U.S. 1 (1945)
(alteration in original)) ("The classroom is peculiarly the
marketplace of ideas .... The Nation's future depends upon
leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust ex-
change of ideas which discovers truth 'out of a multitude of
tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative se-
lection.").
83 See Arthur Lipkin, Project 1. Gay and Lesbian Stu-
[Vol. 6
SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT
The Senators' comments also suggest that there
are no excellent gay and lesbian schoolteachers
who serve as role models to both gay and straight
students. Not only are there thousands of highly
competent gay men and lesbians educating chil-
dren in the schools today,84 it is highly likely that
of all of the teachers that Senators Ashcroft and
Nickles valued as excellent role models for them-
selves, one or more was gay.
3. "Ty Fox" as Red Herring
The Senators' contention that ENDA would
have protected Jeffrey Bruton, the suburban Vir-
ginia coach and teacher, from being forced to re-
sign from his position as a result of having ap-
peared in gay pornographic videos is baseless.
ENDA would prohibit covered employers from
subjecting employees or candidates for employ-
ment "to a different standard or different treat-
ment . . . on the basis of sexual orientation."
8 5
Presumably, Bruton was not treated any differ-
ently by his school administration than the admin-
istration would have treated any other school-
teacher who had appeared in pornographic films,
regardless of whether the films were "straight" or
"gay." The grounds for Bruton's discipline ap-
pear not to have been Bruton's sexual orienta-
tion, which still has not been publicly disclosed,
but the fact that he was a pornographic video star.
It appears that poorjudgment, not sexual orienta-
tion, was what precipitated Bruton's discipline.
Thus, contrary to the Senators' warnings, ENDA
likely would not have protected Bruton against
any adverse employment action by the school.
8 6
dents Find Acceptance in their School Community, TEACH-
ING TOLERANCE 25 (Fall 1992) ("Of all the minorities in
American school populations, young gays and lesbians are
among the most frequently ridiculed, victimized and
shunned."), cited in Nancy Tenney, The Constitutional Impera-
tive of Reality in Public School Curricula: Untruths About Homosex-
uality as a Violation of the First Amendment," 60 BROOK. L. REv.
1599, 1610 n.44 (1995); see alsoJoyce Hunter, Violence Against
Lesbian and Male Gay Youths, 5 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE
295, 297 (1990) (In study of 500 gay and lesbian youths, 40%
were found to have experienced "violent physical attacks").
One study has found that gays and lesbians face victimization
more frequently than any other minority group. See PETER
FINN & TAYLOR McNEIL, THE RESPONSE OF THE CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE SYSTEM TO BIAS CRIME: AN EXPLORATORY REVIEW 2
(1987).
84 See generally ONE TEACHER IN 10: GAY AND LESBIAN EDU-
CATORs TELL THEIR STOIES (Kevin Jennings ed., 1994); RITA
M. KISSEN, THE LAST CLOSET: THE REAL LvES OF LESBIAN AND
GAY TEACHERS (1996).
4. Effects of Existing State Non-Discrimination
Statutes
The Senators' concern that ENDA would en-
able gay and lesbian teachers to infuse their cur-
ricula with gay and lesbian topics is belied by the
effects of state and local laws that prohibit dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
Today, teachers in eleven states and over 100 local
jurisdictions are protected from employment dis-
crimination by ENDA-like statutes.8 7 In addition,
millions of children are educated in school dis-
tricts controlled by cities and counties with non-
discrimination ordinances. There is no evidence
that gay and lesbian teachers in these districts
have sought protection in anti-discrimination stat-
utes for proselytizing on homosexuality in
schools.88 The fact that ENDA-like statutes at the
state and local level have not enabled gay and les-
bian teachers to proselytize is a strong indication
that ENDA would not have the reverse effect if it
were enacted.
IV. THE CATEGORICAL EXCLUSION OF
GAY PEOPLE FROM TEACHING
POSITIONS WOULD VIOLATE THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Not only are the concerns espoused by Senators
Ashcroft and Nickles concerning gay people in
teaching jobs negated by both the successful and
productive work of lesbian and gay teachers in
schools today and findings concerning the nature
of homosexuality itself, the Senators' opinions
beg the question of whether school administrators
85 ENDA § 4.
86 ENDA's construction provision confirms this assess-
ment by clarifying that "[n]othing in this Act shall be con-
strued to prohibit a covered entity from enforcing rules re-
garding nonprivate sexual conduct, if the rules of conduct
are designed for, and uniformly applied to, all individuals re-
gardless of sexual orientation." ENDA § 11.
87 See supra note 16.
88 In fact, a recent General Accounting Office report
found that there was no perceptible spike in litigation of any
kind, including claims brought by lesbian and gay school-
teachers, in those states with ENDA-like statutes in place. See
Gen'l Acct. Off. Rep. on States' Experiences with Sexual Ori-
entation Discrimination Laws B-277688, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) 206 (Oct. 24, 1997) (finding that in states with sexual
orientation non-discrimination statutes in effect, "relatively
few complaints of discrimination in employment on the basis
of sexual orientation were filed annually: and that there was
not evidence "of large numbers of complaints immediately
after the implementation of the sexual orientation statutes.")
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could categorically disqualify lesbians and gay
men from teaching jobs at all. The exclusion of
gay and lesbian people from teaching positions
solely on the theory that they are intrinsically im-
moral and, thus, bad role models for children
likely would violate the due process and equal
protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
A. Constitutional Due Process and the
Emergence of the "Fitness to Teach" Test
With a few striking exceptions, such as Gaylord,
courts over the last several decades have recog-
nized that constitutional due process principles
forbid school administrators from basing hiring
and promotion decisions on standards that are
not rationally related to teaching ability. The
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause re-
quires that the government afford citizens "due
process" before depriving them of life, liberty, or
property."9 Like the Equal Protection Clause, the
Due Process Clause requires that government ac-
tions be at least rationally related to a legitimate
government purpose. 9°1 Thus, no person can be
denied public employment based on factors that
are unconnected with the responsibilities of that
employment.'
1. Norton v. Macy: The Irrelevance of Homosexual
Orientation in Public Employment
Some courts have correctly recognized that ho-
mosexual orientation alone does not affect the eli-
gibility of an individual for public employment.
For example, in Norton v. Macy,92 the Court of Ap-
peals for the D.C. Circuit reversed the dismissal of
a federal employee from ajob at the National Aer-
onautics and Space Administration (NASA) for
"homosexual behavior" outside of working hours,
which the U.S. Civil Service Commission labeled
"immoral."9 -" The court held that the government
89 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 15-1 at 1302-04 (2d
ed. 1988).
90 See, e.g., Duke Power v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group,
Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1978); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
91 See generally Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563
(1968); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
92 See generally 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
93 See id. at 1164-65. See also Scott v. Macy, 349 F.2d 182,
184-85 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (holding that the government may
not rely on mere allegations of homosexuality to discharge
had failed to demonstrate that his "immoral" be-
havior would have an "ascertainable deleterious
effect on the efficiency of the service" he provided
in his job.94 The court determined further that:
"[a] pronouncement of "immorality" tends to dis-
courage careful analysis because it unavoidably
connotes a violation of divine, Olympian, or
otherwise universal standards of rectitude.
'" 95
The court also found that the government had
failed to establish a rational relationship between
Mr. Norton's homosexuality and any threat to the
efficiency of NASA operations, which was the gov-
ernment's only justification for the dismissal."6
2. Norton Applied to Gay and Lesbian Teachers
Some courts have applied the "effect on ser-
vice" principle articulated in Norton in adjudicat-
ing cases involving gay and lesbian teachers, cor-
rectly holding that sexual orientation may be a
factor in public schoolteacher employment deci-
sions only where it may impact the teacher's "fit-
ness to teach." For example, in Morrison v. State
Board of Education,97 the California Supreme
Court held that the state Board of Education
could not revoke Marc Morrison's "life diploma"
(i.e., state teaching certificate) on the grounds of
a "limited, non-criminal physical relationship ...
of a homosexual nature."98  Morrison was a
schoolteacher in the Lowell, California Joint
School District where he maintained a satisfactory
performance record. 99 During his employment in
the Lowell public school system, Morrison be-
came friends with Fred Schneringer, another pub-
lic schoolteacher. 100 In a period of marital diffi-
culties, Mr. Schneringer had sex with Morrison on
four separate occasions in a one-week period. I°
One year after Schneringer and Morrison ended
their affair, Schneringer reported Morrison's ho-
mosexuality to the Superintendent of the Lowell
Joint School District, which resulted in the Cali-
fornia Board of Education revoking Morrison's
an employee, but instead must identify specific conduct it
finds immoral and demonstrate how such conduct affects the
employee's fitness for position).
94 Norton, 417 F.2d at 1165.
95 Id.
96 See id.
97 461 P.2d 375 (Cal. 1969) (en banc).
98 Id. at 377-78.
99 See id. at 377.
100 See id.
101 See id. at 377-78.
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life diploma. 102
In reversing the revocation, the court recog-
nized that the Board of Education failed to pres-
ent any evidence indicating that Morrison "had
ever committed any act of misconduct whatsoever
while teaching[,]" and that "uninformed specula-
tion or conjecture" about immorality was insuffi-
cient grounds to terminate Morrison's teaching
privileges.103 The court held that an admission of
homosexual conduct, absent evidence of "unfit-
ness to teach," was insufficient grounds for the
revocation. 1
0 4
Morrison is not the only case that properly ac-
cords due process protection to gay and lesbian
teachers terminated on the basis of vague notions
of morality, and without regard to teaching ability
and effectiveness. In Board of Education v. Jack
M.,1 0 5 the California Supreme Court, citing Morri-
son, held that a teacher arrested for "homosexual
solicitation" was inappropriately fired from his el-
ementary school teaching position because the
teacher's arrest "did not demonstrate unfitness to
102 See id. at 378.
103 Id. at 378, 393.
104 Id. at 391. The court specified the following criteria
for determining "unfitness to teach":
[Tihe likelihood that the conduct may have adversely af-
fected students or fellow teachers, the degree of such ad-
versity anticipated, the proximity or remoteness in time
of the conduct, the type of teaching certificate held by
the party involved, the extenuating or aggravating cir-
cumstances, if any, surrounding the conduct, the praise-
worthiness or blameworthiness of the motives resulting
in the conduct .... and the extent to which disciplinary
action may inflict an adverse impact or chilling effect
upon constitutional fights of the teacher involved or
other teachers.
Id. at 386 (citations omitted).
105 19 Cal.3d 691 (1977).
106 Id. at 694.
107 233 N.E.2d 143 (Ct. C.P. Ohio 1967).
108 Id. at 146.
109 216 N.W. 2d 339 (Iowa 1974).
110 Id. at 343.
111 See, e.g., Ponton v. Newport News Sch. Bd., 632 F.
Supp. 1056 (E.D. Va. 1986). In Ponton, an unwed pregnant
teacher was given the choice of quitting, getting married, or
taking an unpaid leave of absence when it became known
that she was pregnant. See id. at 1059. A Virginia federal
court sided with Ponton, who claimed that the school board's
actions violated her Constitutional right to privacy and con-
stituted sex discrimination proscribed by Title VII. See id. at
1061. The court held that there was no evidence that being
pregnant out of wedlock indicated some moral defect that
would render Ponton unfit to teach, "no evidence that [she]
intended to proselytize her students regarding the issue of
unwed pregnancy[,]" and no danger that her being pregnant
out of wedlock would be seen as "a School Board-sponsored
statement regarding the desirability of pregnancy out of wed-
teach."'1 6 In Jarvella v. Willoughby-Eastlake City
School District,1 0 7 the Ohio Court of Common
Pleas found that as long as a teacher's private con-
duct does not affect his professional achievement,
his "private acts are his own business and may not
be the basis of discipline."108 Similarly, in Erb v.
Iowa State Board of Public Instruction,0 9 the Iowa
Supreme Court held that in determining whether
an individual is qualified to serve as a school-
teacher, "the personal moral views of board mem-
bers cannot be relevant." 110 Following this ap-
proach, courts across the nation began
invalidating public schoolteacher terminations on
such "immorality" grounds as unwed preg-
nancy,' 11 adultery,' 12 and unmarried cohabita-
tion. ' 13
A more recent case reminiscent of Morrison is
Ross v. Springfield School District No. 19.' 14 In Ross,
the Supreme Court of Oregon invalidated a
schoolteacher's discharge for "immorality" where
the determination of immorality was based solely
on references to "community moral standards"
lock." Id. at 1062-63. See also Drake v. Covington County Bd.
of Educ., 371 F. Supp. 974, 979 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (holding
that an Alabama statute allowing termination of a teacher
based on immorality was not facially unconstitutional due to
vagueness, but violated Drake's constitutional right to privacy
as applied to her); Leechburg Area Sch. Dist. v. Pennsylvania,
339 A.2d 850, 853 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1975) (denying unwed
pregnant teachers a leave of absence, thus terminating their
employment, violates Section 5(a) of the Pennsylvania
Human Relations Act, which prohibited discrimination based
on sex).
112 See Erb v. Iowa State Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 216
N.W.2d 339 (Iowa 1974). In Erb, the Iowa Supreme Court
restored Richard Erb's high school teaching certificate,
which had been revoked when the other teacher's husband
brought to the school board's attention that Erb had been
involved in an adulterous affair with another teacher (who
was leaving the teaching profession to pursue a different ca-
reer). See id. at 341. The court found notable that numerous
witnesses, including Erb's principle and superintendent, tes-
tified that his teaching was highly rated and was unaffected
by the affair. See id. The court in Erb did not find evidence
"of a reasonable likelihood that the teacher's retention in the
profession [would] adversely affect the school community."
Id. at 344.
113 See Thompson v. Southwest Sch. Dist., 483 F. Supp.
1170 (W.D. Mo. 1980). In Thompson, the plaintiff was a sec-
ond grade teacher who was cohabiting with a man to whom
she was not married. See id. at 1173. Her ability as a teacher
was never questioned. See id. at 1175. She was removed due
to fear of a public outcry over the matter. See id. at 1183. The
court stated that the "fact that.some parents may have an ad-
verse attitude towards plaintiff is not sufficient evidence...
that an attitude would prevail in the classroom that would un-
dermine the learning environment." Id.
114 716 P.2d 724 (Or. 1986) (en banc).
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and where the termination was in no way based
on negative findings concerning the school-




Categorically disqualifying gay men and lesbi-
ans from teaching positions solely on the ground
that they are "not the right type of role models"
would also likely violate constitutional equal pro-
tection principles. The Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause prohibits state and local
governments from engaging in intentional invidi-
ous discrimination between otherwise similarly sit-
uated persons based on membership in a defina-
ble class, absent a rational basis for doing so.'' 6
Under the basic "mere rationality" standard of re-
view for equal protection cases not involving a
"suspect class" (i.e., race, religion, etc.) or a fun-
damental right (e.g., speech), the court asks
"whether it is conceivable that the classification
bears a rational relationship to an end of govern-
ment which is not prohibited by the Constitu-
tion."' 17
1. Romer v. Evans
In its landmark 1996 Romer v. Evans" 18 decision,
the Supreme Court relied upon the Constitution's
equal protection guarantee to protect the inter-
ests of gay people. Romer held that Amendment 2
to the Colorado Constitution violated the Equal
Protection Clause insofar as it failed to further a
proper legislative end by prohibiting an entire
class of persons (i.e., gay and lesbian Coloradans)
from seeking legislation to redress injustices.'1
Romer elucidated what the Supreme Court consid-
115 See id. at 730-31.
116 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I (a State shall not
"deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws."); see also TRIBE, supra note 89, §§ 16-1, 16-2,
at 1436-43.
117 JOHN E. NOWAK et al., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.1, at
524 (3d ed. 1986).
118 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
119 See id. at 1629.
120 Id.
121 See id. at 1628-29.
122 Id. at 1628.
123 Id. at 1629.
124 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
125 See id. at 191, 194-96.
126 U.S. CONST., amend. XIV; see also TRIBE, supra note
89, § 15-1, at 1302.
ers not to be a rational basis for discrimination
against gay people. The state had argued that the
rationale for Amendment 2 included "respect for
other citizens' freedom of association, and in par-
ticular the liberties of landlords or employers who
have personal or religious objections to homosex-
uality."' 2 1 Justice Kennedy, writing for the major-
ity, rejected the state's rationale, declaring that
animosity toward the class of homosexuals is not a
legitimate basis for state action. 12 1 Justice Ken-
nedy asserted that Amendment 2 "is at once too
narrow and too broad. It identifies persons by a
single trait and then denies them protection
across the board."'122 He wrote that Amendment
2 "classifie[d] homosexuals" as "unequal to every-
one else. This Colorado cannot do.
'" 12 3
To a certain extent, Romer redeems the
Supreme Court's earlier infamous decision affect-
ing gay and lesbian civil rights, Bowers v. Hard-
wick. 124 In Hardwick, the Supreme Court found
that the Georgia sodomy statute, which prohibits
private, consensual sodomy between two adults,
does not run afoul of an individual's right to pri-
vacy as an element of the Fourteenth Amendment
right to due process,125 which, as discussed above,
prohibits state restrictions on human conduct
that constitute an unreasonable denial of an indi-
vidual's "life, liberty, or property.'' 1 26 Hardwick
not only armed states with the Supreme Court's
imprimatur to continue criminalizing homosexual
sexual relations, 127 but had the broader effect of
legitimizing judicial prejudices against gay men
and lesbians in matters unrelated to sexual rela-
tions. 128
Hardwick generated intense negative scholarly
criticism against the Supreme Court, 129 particu-
larly because it denied gay people the type of per-
127 See Missouri v. Walsh, 713 S.W.2d 508, 511 (Mo.
1986) (en banc) (relying on the United States Supreme
Court's two-week-old decision in Hardwick, the Missouri
Supreme Court upheld that state's sodomy law from a privacy
challenge); Louisiana v. Neal, 500 So.2d 374, 378 (La. 1987)
(upholding anti-solicitation and sodomy statutes relying on
Hardwick).
128 See, e.g., Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068,
1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("After Hardwick it cannot logically be
asserted that discrimination against homosexuals is constitu-
tionally infirm."). In large measure, some judges have misap-
plied Hardwick in starting from the premise that all homosex-
ual conduct is equivalent to the homosexual sodomy at issue
in Hardwick. See Feldblum, supra note 46, at 283 (citing
Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984) and
Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
129 See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 -ARv.
[Vol. 6
SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT
sonal freedom to engage in private, consensual
sexual relationships it had accorded heterosexuals
in a series of important privacy decisions.°30 Criti-
cism of Hardwick as a wrongly-decided decision in-
tensified when it became known that Justice Lewis
F. Powell, the deciding vote on the Hardwick ma-
jority, later regretted voting to uphold the Geor-
gia sodomy statute. In an October 18, 1990 lec-
ture at New York University Law School, Justice
Powell was asked how he reconciled his support of
Roe v. Wade13' with his vote in Hardwick, to which
he responded "I think I probably made a mistake
in that one.'
1 32
2. Nabozny v. Podlesny
That Romer has to some extent eclipsed Hard-
wick as the benchmark for applying constitutional
protections to gay and lesbian Americans was evi-
dent in the case of Nabozny v. Podlesny.133 In Na-
bozny, Jamie Nabozny sued the Ashland, Wiscon-
sin school district for, inter alia, violating his
Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection
by discriminating against him as a homosexual.
Nabozny argued that school administrators not
only ignored his requests for assistance in re-
sponding to continuous verbal and physical anti-
gay abuse from fellow students, but also them-
selves mocked Nabozny's predicament. 34 Apply-
ing mere rational review scrutiny, the Seventh Cir-
cuit held that "ft]here can be little doubt that
homosexuals are an identifiable minority sub-
jected to discrimination in our society," and that
"discrimination against Nabozny based on his sex-
ual orientation . . . was unlawful.' 3 5  Having
found the board liable under basic rational re-
view, the court refused to express an opinion on
whether sexual orientation is an "obvious, immu-
L. REv. 737, 799-802 (1989) (contending that the Hardwick
majority incorrectly applied the due process test); Thomas B.
Stoddard, Bowers v. Hardwick: Precedent by Personal Predilection,
54 U. CHI. L. REv. 648, 655-56 (1987) (arguing that Hardwick
constitutes nothing more than the embodiment of the jus-
tices' anti-homosexual sentiment); Kendall Thomas, Beyond
the Privacy Principle, 92 COL. L. REv. 1431, 1461 (1992) (posit-
ing that Hardwick illegitimately endorses cruel and unusual
punishment against homosexuals); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
From Hand-Holding to Sodomy: First Amendment Protection of Ho-
mosexual (Expressive) Conduct," 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 319,
325-330 (1994) (contending that Hardwick violates gay and
lesbian citizens' First Amendment expression rights).
130 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 338 U.S. 1 (1967) (right of
interracial couple to marry); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972) (right of unmarried persons to contraception); Roe v.
table, or distinguishing" characteristic-a stan-
dard for the application of strict scrutiny-but in-
dicated nevertheless that "it does seem dubious to
suggest that someone would choose to be homo-
sexual, absent some genetic predisposition, given
the considerable discrimination leveled against
homosexuals."' "3
3. Romer and Nabozny Applied to Gay and Lesbian
Teachers
Romer and Nabozny evince an important evolu-
tion in the attitude of the American judiciary. No
doubt influenced by society's evolving under-
standing of the nature of sexual orientation, it ap-
pears that judges, like certain legislators, are
much less willing to enforce traditional anti-gay
prejudices and instead have begun to view gay
people as multi-faceted individuals entitled to the
political and social enfranchisement afforded all
Americans.
As a result, it is likely that a post-Romer court
would find that categorically excluding gay and
lesbian people from teaching positions for no
other government end than to endorse the anti-
gay sentiments of only one sector of the commu-
nity, would violate the right to equal protection of
the affected gay and lesbian people. Under basic
rational basis review, the level of scrutiny applied
in Romer, there is no constitutional violation if
"there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts"
that would provide a rational basis for the govern-
ment's conduct.13 7 It would be highly unlikely
that a court would be able to garner any rational
basis for a school board's categorical disqualifica-
tion of gay men and lesbians from schoolteacher
positions for no other reason than the belief that
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to abortion); and Carey v.
Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (right to access
of contraceptive technology).
131 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
132 JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR.
518-530 (1994), excerpted in RUBENSrEIN, supra note 46, at 245,
251. In confirming his remark to a reporter, he explained
"When I had the opportunity to reread the opinions a few
months later, I thought the dissent had the better of the ar-
guments." Id.
133 92 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1996).
134 Id. at 449.
135 Id. at 457.
136 See id. at 457 n.10.




gay people are intrinsically immoral and, thus, are
poor role models for children.
V. SENATORS MISCHARACTERIZE ENDA'S
EFFECTS ON TEACHERS' FIRST
AMENDMENT RIGHTS
A. ENDA Would Not Alter Existing Caselaw
According Curricular and Pedagogical
Decisions to School Boards and School
Administrators
Senator Ashcroft's opposition to employment
non-discrimination protection for what he terms
"open homosexual leaders" and "gay activists, as
teachers in the fifth grade," presupposes that
ENDA's passage would permit gay and lesbian
teachers to proselytize in the classroom. Such a
characterization of ENDA's scope is fundamen-
tally incorrect. ENDA's only function is to ensure
that employees and candidates are judged by their
ability to do their job and not on the basis of their
sexual orientation. Thus, ENDA generally would
not affect the ability of school boards and school
administrators to control the classroom speech of
teachers.
1. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier and its
Progeny Confirm the Power of School Boards Over
Reasonable Restrictions on In-Classroom Speech
The Supreme Court has long recognized that
decisions about the appropriateness of classroom
curricula are the province of school boards and
school administrators. Although the Court has ac-
knowledged that it cannot "be argued that either
students or teachers shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate,"' 38 it has held consistently that
the constitutional rights of teachers and students
in school cannot be as extensive as they are
outside the schoolhouse. School officials must
138 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist.,
393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (allowing students, suspended for
wearing armbands to protest the Vietnam war, to express
controversial opinions as long as they did not materially and
substantially interfere with the discipline in or operation of
the school, or collide with the fights of others).
139 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
140 See id. at 266.
141 Id. at 267 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 47 (1983).
142 Id. (quoting Pery, 460 U.S. at 46 n.7) (emphasis ad-
have control over curriculum and conduct in or-
der to ensure that reasonably uniform instruction
standards are applied in the classroom setting.
Although no Supreme Court precedent directly
addresses the scope of the First Amendment
rights of teachers in the classroom, the case of Ha-
zelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,139 which ad-
dresses the in-school free speech rights of stu-
dents, has provided the judicial construct upon
which lower courts have based standards for the
protection of in-school teacher speech. The
Supreme Court in Hazelwood found that school of-
ficials did not violate the free speech right of stu-
dents by deleting two pages of articles concerning
pregnancy and divorce from the school newspa-
per. 40 It explained that where school facilities
have not been opened for "indiscriminate use by
the general public;" the school is not a public fo-
rum.' 4 1 As a result, "school officials may impose
reasonable restrictions on the speech of students,
teachers, and other members of the school commu-
nity."'142 The court held that reasonable restric-
tions on in-school speech, however, must be rea-
sonably related to "legitimate pedagogical
concerns."
143
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals was the
first Federal Circuit Court to apply Hazelwood to
the in-class free speech rights of teachers. In
Bishop v. Aronov,144 the court found that a memo-
randum from the head of a state university de-
partment, instructing a professor to refrain from
interjecting religious discussions into his classes,
did not violate the professor's First Amendment
rights because the memorandum's restrictions
only applied to the classroom speech of the pro-
fessor "wherever he purports to conduct a class
for the University."
145
The First Circuit similarly relied upon Hazel-
wood in its 1993 Ward v. Hickey146 decision, where
it rejected a high school teacher's First Amend-
ment claim against her local school board for re-
ded).
143 Id. at 273. The court identified at least three such
concerns: (1) "that participants learn whatever the activity is
designed to teach," (2) "that readers or listeners are not ex-
posed to material that may be inappropriate for their level of
maturity," and (3) "that the views of the individual speaker
are not erroneously attributed to the school." Id. at 271.
144 926 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1991).
145 Id. at 1075-76.
146 996 F.2d 448 (1st Cir. 1993).
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fusing to rehire her in part because she had led a
discussion in a ninth-grade biology class of the
abortion of Down's Syndrome fetuses. 14 7 The
court stated: "we find that a school committee
may regulate a teacher's classroom speech if: (1)
the regulation is reasonably related to a legitimate
pedagogical concern; and (2) the school provided
the teacher with notice of what conduct was pro-
hibited[.] "148
2. Proselytizing is Not Protected In-Classroom Speech
Senator Aschroft's concerns notwithstanding,
courts have held that school administrators may
properly restrict in-classroom proselytizing or re-
cruitment for political or social causes by teach-
ers. In Burns v. Rovaldi,149 a Connecticut federal
district court upheld the dismissal of a public
teacher who incorporated into his penmanship
class a pen-pal program between his students and
his fiancee through which the students received
letters advocating communism and attacking the
American capitalist system.' 50 Other courts have
held similarly,' 5' holding that proselytization of
any kind is contrary to the interest of the state in
preserving the educational process and properly
socializing children. In James v. Board of Educa-
tion,1 52 the Second Circuit found that "[w]hen a
teacher is only content if he persuades his stu-
dents that his values and only his values ought to
be their values, then it is not unreasonable to ex-
pect the state to protect impressionable children
from such dogmatism."1
53
The notion that ENDA would protect lesbian
and gay public schoolteachers for proselytizing on
homosexuality in public schools also is inconsis-
tent with the nature and origins of homosexuality.
Presumably, most lesbian and gay public school-
teachers understand the generally unchangeable
147 See id. at 452.
148 Id. (citation omitted). The Ward court noted that "in
this circuit, we have determined the propriety of school regu-
lations by considering circumstances such as age and sophis-
tication of students, relationship between teaching method
and valid educational objectives, and context and manner of
presentation." Id. The court cited to prior First Circuit pre-
cedent, such as Mailloux v. Kiley, 448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir.
1971). The Mailloux court had recognized that
free speech does not grant teachers a license to say or
write in class whatever they may feel like, and that the
propriety of regulations or sanctions must depend on
such circumstances as the age and sophistication of the
students, the closeness of the relation between the spe-
cific technique used and some concededly valid educa-
nature of sexual orientation and would recognize
that proselytizing or otherwise attempting to "con-
vert" students to homosexuality would be a funda-
mentally futile exercise. Moreover, given that
homophobia remains a serious societal affliction,
and the fact that lesbian and gay schoolteachers
continue to be politically useful targets for anti-
gay activists, it is hard to believe that lesbian and
gay schoolteachers would put their jobs at risk by
attempting to "recruit" students into homosexual-
ity, regardless of the futility of the effort. In addi-
tion, the belief that ENDA somehow would em-
power lesbian and gay schoolteachers to
proselytize without recourse not only miscon-
strues the narrow scope of ENDA (i.e., prohibit-
ing employment discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation), but also is negated by the
track record of ENDA-like laws in ten states and
many local jurisdictions. There is no recorded in-
stance of any of these laws being used to protect
lesbian or gay schoolteachers from disciplinary ac-
tion for any form of proselytization.
154
B. Teachers' Out-of-School Speech is
Constitutionally Protected
Senator Ashcroft's suggestion that a school
board should be permitted to bar the employ-
ment of "open homosexual leaders" and "gay ac-
tivists" also mistakenly connotes that passage of
ENDA somehow would alter the ability of school
boards to govern the out-of-school speech of
teachers. It appears that Senator Ashcroft is
under the mistaken belief that school boards and
school administrators now have the ability to dis-
criminate against teachers who are politically ac-
tive and that ENDA would interfere with this abil-
ity. Because ENDA would only prohibit
employment discrimination on the basis of sexual
tional objective, and the context and manner of presen-
tation.
Id. at 1243; see also Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359, 362 (lst
Cir. 1969) (noting that "the offensiveness of language and
the particular propriety or impropriety is dependent on the
circumstances of the utterance").
149 477 F. Supp. 270-71, 276 (D. Conn. 1979).
150 Id. at 270, 276.
15' See Russo v. Central Sch. Dist. No. 1, 469 F.2d 623,
632 (2d Cir. 1972); James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566,
573 (2d Cir. 1972).
152 461 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1972).
153 Id. at 573.
154 See supra note 16.
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orientation, it likely would have no impact on the
well-settled body of law governing teachers' rights
to free speech outside of the classroom.
The principal Supreme Court decision clarify-
ing the nature of teachers' free speech rights
outside of the classroom is Pickering v. Board of Ed-
ucation.155 In Pickering, the Court invalidated as
unconstitutional the firing of a teacher following
the publication in a local newspaper of the
teacher's letter to the editor criticizing the
board's financial activities.
15 6
The Court recognized that, in free speech cases
involving public schoolteachers, there is a conflict
between the state's interest as an employer in con-
trolling the speech of its employees and the ex-
pressive interests of those employees. Citing its
earlier decision in Keyishian v. Board of Regents, the
Court held that school boards may not compel
teachers "to relinquish the First Amendment
rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to
comment on matters of public interest in connec-
tion with the operation of the public schools in
which they work."'
157
In reaching this conclusion, the Court imple-
mented a balancing test that weighs "the interests
of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon
matters of public concern and the interest of the
State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency
of the public services it performs through its em-
ployees."' 158 This test allows a school to restrict or
punish a public schoolteacher's speech on mat-
ters of public concern only if the speech would
harm the school's ability to operate efficiently or
inhibit the teacher's ability to carry out his or her
duties. In implementing this test, the Court held
that school boards must respect a teacher's right
to expression outside the classroom because
there, a teacher's interest in free expression ex-
ceeds any school interest in suppressing the ex-
pression as a way of promoting its own inter-
ests.
1 5 9
Pickering's progeny confirms that the nature of
155 391 U.S. 563 (1969).
156 See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 573.
157 Id. at 568 (Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S.
589, 606 (1967) (holding that states may not punish teachers
for out-of-school associations absent a compelling state inter-
est)).
158 Id.
159 See id. at 572.
160 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983).
161 See id. at 154.
162 See id.
government employees' speech determines the
government's ability to restrict that speech. For
example, in Connick v. Myers,160 the Supreme
Court denied the claim of an assistant district at-
torney who challenged her dismissal, which fol-
lowed her distribution of a questionnaire to col-
leagues about their work conditions.' 61 The
Court held that the employee's expression was
merely internal workplace speech, did not address
a matter of public concern and, therefore, was not
protected by the First Amendment.162 By con-
trast, the Court in Rankin v. McPherson'63 invali-
dated the dismissal of a government employee
who, following the assassination attempt against
President Ronald Reagan, stated to a co-worker:
"[I]f they go for him again, I hope they get
him."'164 The Court held that the employee's
speech could be "fairly characterized as constitut-
ing speech on a matter of public concern" and
thus was protected by the Free Speech clause.
16 5
Lower courts have applied the Pickering rule to
protect teachers from retaliation for their expres-
sion about sexual orientation. In National Gay
Task Force v. Board of Education,166 the Tenth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, which an evenly split
Supreme Court affirmed, invalidated a portion of
Oklahoma's "Helm Bill," which replicated the lan-
guage of the infamous anti-gay California Briggs
Initiative. 167 The Tenth Circuit found that the
prohibition against "advocating ... encouraging
or promoting public or private homosexual activ-
ity in a manner that creates a substantial risk that
such conduct will come to the attention of school
children or school employees" was unconstitu-
tionally overbroad.'68 Citing Pickering, the Tenth
Circuit reasoned that although the state has an in-
terest in regulating schoolteacher speech, it can
do so only when the expression "results in a mate-
rial or substantial . . . disruption in the normal
activities of the school."'1 6" The Court concluded
that the Oklahoma Board of Education had
"made no such showing."' 170 In the 1974 Acanfora
163 483 U.S. 378 (1987).
164 Id. at 381.
165 Id. at 384 (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 146).
166 729 F.2d 1270, (10th Cir. 1984), affd by an equally di-
vided Court, 470 U.S. 903 (1985).
167 729 F.2d at 1272.
168 Id. at 1272, 1275.
169 Id. at 1274, also citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
170 Id.
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v. Board of Education171 case, the Supreme Court
let stand a Fourth Circuit ruling that a gay high
school teacher's statements in press and television
interviews regarding his sexuality did not disrupt
his workplace and were protected under the First
Amendment. 72 Similarly, in Aumiller v. University
of Delaware,173 the Delaware Federal District Court
found thatAumiller's public statements about ho-
mosexuality did not "impede[ ] his performance
of his daily duties, substantially disrupt[ ] the Uni-
versity, violate[ ] an express need for confidential-
ity, or disrupt[ ] his working relationship with his
superiors."1
74
In sum, it is unlikely that a school board or
school administrator would succeed in disciplin-
ing a schoolteacher for "gay activism" or "homo-
sexual leadership" outside of the classroom. Such
expression addresses a matter of public concern
(i.e., equal rights for lesbians and gay men) and
most likely would not disrupt school activities nor
diminish the teacher's ability to carry out his or
her duties.
C. Gay and Lesbian Teachers' Out-of-
Classroom "PDAs" Are Constitutionally
Protected
The argument made on the Senate floor that
171 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1974).
172 Id. at 499. The First Amendment principle enunci-
ated by the Fourth Circuit in Acanfora was enforced a few
years later in Aumiller v. University of Delaware, by a Dela-
ware Federal district court. See 434 F. Supp. 1273 (D. Del.
1977). In Aumiller, the court found that Aumiller's public
statements about homosexuality did not "impede[] his per-
formance of his daily duties, substantially disrupt[ ] the Uni-
versity, violate[ ] an express need for confidentiality, or dis-
rupt[ ] his working relationship with his superiors." Id. at
1312. Similarly, in National Gay Task Force, the Supreme
Court let stand a Tenth Circuit decision upholding a state
statute's constitutionality insofar as it provided for the dismis-
sal for engaging in "public homosexual conduct," but uncon-
stitutionally overbroad and violative of the First Amendment
insofar as "public homosexual conduct" included "advocacy."
729 F.2d at 1273-74. The Court opined that the state's right
in regulating the speech of its employees overcomes the
teacher's free speech rights only when the free speech results
in a substantial or material interference or disruption in
school activities, neither of which was demonstrated by the
State in this case. Id. at 1274-75.
173 434 F. Supp. 1273 (D. Del. 1977).
174 Id. at 1273.
175 142 CONG. REc S9986, S9993 (daily ed. Sept. 6,1996)
(statement of Sen. Hatch). These assertions are quite remi-
niscent of those articulated by Lynn H. Greene, an anti-gay
activist in Oregon who fought for the rejection of an anti-
discrimination ordinance in Eugene, Oregon by declaring
under ENDA, a school board would be prohibited
from "tak[ing] action" against a male teacher who
"during nonschool hours and in public, holds
hands, walks arm in arm with his [boy]friend, and
engages in some kissing17 5 begs the question of
Whether school boards can now, absent ENDA,
regulate out-of-classroom PDAs in general and
proscribe only same-sex out-of-classroom PDAs
specifically. They cannot. This argument appears
to overlook the fact that, regardless of whether
ENDA is enacted, the Constitution's free speech
and equal protection guarantees would forbid a
school board or school administrator from imple-
menting such a blatant double standard.
1. PDAs as Constitutionally Protected Speech
Although most public schoolteachers, like
other public employees, may be dismissed without
cause, 176 they cannot be dismissed or otherwise
disciplined as a result of their exercise of a consti-
tutional right. 17 7 Moreover, although constitu-
tional protection of individual expression tradi-
tionally has been interpreted as covering only
speaking or writing, contemporary courts have ac-
corded such protection to "symbolic" or political
speech as well.' 78 Public displays of affection be-
tween a gay or lesbian teacher and another per-
that the ordinance "would encourage homosexuals to kiss,
caress and dance in public, slap fannies, ask heterosexuals
for dates at places of employment or in bars, and will even
allow for the occasional touching of the genitals." Gay Rights
Voted Down in Eugene, S.F. CHRON., date unknown (quoted in
HARBECK, supra note 37, at 55).
176 See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564
(1972) (finding that public employees may be discharged
without cause and without a prior hearing where there is no
contractual expectancy of continued employment).
177 See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 563 (prohibiting the dismis-
sal of public employees for exercising free speech rights in
absence of overriding considerations regarding workplace
harmony and discipline); cf Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 283-84 (1977) (public school-
teacher's exercise of constitutional right may contribute to
dismissal or other discipline as long as exercise of right not
primary motivating factor justifying employment action).
178 See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)
(deeming that draft card burning prohibition is not related
to expression because law "does not distinguish between pub-
lic and private destruction"); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 559 (1965) (picketing); International Bhd. of Team-
sters, Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957) (picket-
ing); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (placing
peace symbols on, and then displaying, American flag); Co-
hen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (wearingjacket bearing
words "Fuck the Draft"); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131
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son of the same sex during nonschool hours may
be considered a form of such protected "sym-
bolic" or political speech.' 79 Courts have dis-
agreed on the kinds of same-sex expressions, how-
ever, that could be deemed protectible speech.
a. Fricke v. Lynch
In Fricke v. Lynch, 8" a Federal District Court in
Rhode Island held that a male student's plan to
take a male date to his senior prom had "signifi-
cant expressive content" and thus was protected
by the First Amendment as symbolic speech. 8"
Aaron Fricke identified himself as gay 'to his
school community and requested permission to
take a male escort to the prom. The school de-
nied Fricke's request, claiming that Aaron's at-
tending the prom with a same-sex escort may in-
cite violence and may result in Aaron or his escort
being attacked by other students.18 2 Disagreeing,
the court found that although the action of going
to a prom may not have expressive import for
most people, it did for Fricke.18 3 The court noted
further that Fricke "wants to go because he feels
he has a right to attend and participate just like all
other students and that it would be dishonest to
his own sexual identity to take a girl to the
dance."'18 4 Fricke also testified that he thought
his attendance "would have a certain political ele-
ment and would be a statement for equal rights
and human rights."'
18 5
The Fricke court applied the Supreme Court's
United States v. O'Brien test,' 86 which governs the
review of regulations that incidentally infringe
upon an individual's expression, and found that
the school's denial of Fricke's request violated his
(1966) (remaining in segregated facility); Thornhill v. Ala-
bama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (loitering and picketing);
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (displaying red
flag).
179 See TRIBE, supra note 89, § 12-7, at 827-28 (positing
that all "speech" is a combination of expression and conduct
and that distinctions between speech and conduct are less
dispositive of the permissibility of a restriction than is the ba-
sis for the restriction). See aLso David Cole and William N.
Eskridge, Jr., From Hand-Holding to Sodomy: First Amendment
Protection of Homosexual (Expressive) Conduct, 29 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 319 (1994) (positing that discrimination against
a gay or lesbian individual on the basis of expressive activity
that identifies the individual as a homosexual should be
viewed as a violation of the individual's free speech right).
180 491 F. Supp. 381 (D.R.I. 1980).
181 Id. at 388.
182 Id. at 383-84.
183 See id.
freedom of expression right because the school
could have taken "security measures to control
the risk of harm" posed by Fricke's symbolic
speech. 187 The Fricke court also noted that in or-
der for the state to restrict a "particular expres-
sion of opinion," it must "show that its action was
caused by something more than a mere desire to
avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that al-
ways accompany an unpopular viewpoint."188
b. Gay Law Students Association v. Pacific
Telephone and Telegraph Co.
Fricke is not the only case in which a court has
held that certain types of homosexual expression
have symbolic or political importance. In Gay Law
Students Association v. Pacific Telephone and Tele-
graph Co. ("P7T'),'19 the California Supreme
Court held that the policies and practices of the
public telephone utility denying employment to
"manifest" homosexuals, or other persons "who
make an issue of their homosexuality" violated
both the California and Federal Equal Protection
Clauses and the state labor code.' 9° The PTT
court held that employee expression involving
self-identification as homosexual, speech that "de-
fends" homosexuality, or speech that discloses
personal affiliation with gay rights organizations,
can be considered protectible political speech.19
The court acknowledged that "one important as-
pect of the struggle for equal rights is to induce
homosexual individuals to 'come out of the
closet'. ... "192 Accordingly, the court held that
PTT's discriminatory policies constituted an "at-
tempt to coerce or influence. . .employees...
to... refrain from adopting [a] particular course
14 id. at 385.
185 Id.
186 391 U.S. at 378-80. O'Brien asks the following four
questions:
(1) was the regulation within the constitutional power of
government, (2) did it further an important or substan-
tial government interest, (3) was the governmental inter-
est unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and
(4) was the incidental restriction of alleged first amend-
ment freedoms no greater than essential to further that
interest?
Fricke, 491 F. Supp. at 385 (citing application of O'Brien test
by Gay Students Org. v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1974).
187 Fricke, 491 F. Supp. at 385.
188 Id. at 386.
189 24 Cal. 3d 458, 488 (1979).
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or line of political activity," in violation of these
employees' First Amendment rights. 193
c. Rowland v. Mad River Local School District
The Sixth Circuit's Rowland v. Mad River Local
School District'94 decision, however, argues against
treating an expression of homosexuality as a mat-
ter of public concern satisfying the Picker-
ing test.' 9 5 Marjorie Rowland, a high school gui-
dance counselor, was transferred to a position
with no student contact and then was told her
contract would not be renewed because she had
talked about her bisexuality with coworkers. 196
The Sixth Circuit rejected Rowland's First
Amendment challenge, holding that because
Rowland had discussed her bisexuality with her
coworkers privately and in confidence, and be-
cause "[t] here was absolutely no evidence of any
public concern in the community ... with the is-
sue of bisexuality among school personnel," Row-
land's statements about her bisexuality did not
touch a matter of public concern and thus mer-
ited no First Amendment protection. 197
Rowland was wrongly decided. Most notably, in
discounting Marjorie Rowland's speech as "pri-
vate," the Sixth Circuit inappropriately ignored
the fact that the Mad River Local School District
disciplined Rowland because of how the community
would have reacted to her bisexuality. In his dis-
sent from the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari,
Justice Brennan, who was joined by Justice Mar-
shall, acknowledged correctly that the homosexu-
ality or bisexuality of a schoolteacher is a matter
of public concern, regardless of whether that
schoolteacher's sexual orientation is announced
to the public.'98
Even if Rowland had been correctly decided,
however, it could easily be distinguished from the
193 Id. at 487.
194 730 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984).
195 Id. at 449. Rowland relied on the Supreme Court's
Connick v. Myers decision, which held that:
when a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon
matters of public concern, but instead as an employee
upon matters only of personal interest, absent the most
unusual circumstances, a federal court is not the appro-
priate forum in which to review the wisdom of a person-
nel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reac-
tion to the employee's behavior. 461 U.S. 138, 147
(1983).
196 See Rowland, 730 F.2d at 446.
197 Id. at 449.
198 See Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S.
case of a gay or lesbian schoolteacher who is disci-
plined for engaging in out-of-classroom same-sex
PDAs. Unlike Rowland's confidential conversa-
tions with her colleagues, PDAs, by their nature,
are clearly "public."
d. Shahar v. Bowers
Another case that muddles the free speech
rights of gay and lesbian schoolteachers is the
Eleventh Circuit's relatively recent Shahar v. Bow-
ers' 99 decision. Although not a case dealing with
schoolteachers specifically, Shahar does address
the expression rights of gay and lesbian public
employees and, thus, is relevant to this analysis.
In Shahar, Georgia Attorney General Michael J.
Bowers-of Bowers v. Hardwick fame-succeeded
at persuading the Eleventh Circuit that he vio-
lated no law when he withdrew a job offer to an
attorney, Robin Shahar, on the basis that Shahar
had entered into a lesbian marriage. 2° Applying
the Pickering balancing test, the court found that
the Attorney General's interest in hiring assistant
attorneys general "in whom he has trust" out-
weighed Shahar's right to free speech (as exer-
cised in her same-sex marriage ceremony).2'0 Al-
luding to Hardwick, the court found relevant that
the Attorney General "had already engaged in
and won a recent battle about homosexual sod-
omy,"212 and that it was reasonable for Bowers to
have considered that Shahar's wedding could
have affected her "credibility," would have "inter-
fere[d] with the Department's ability to handle
certain kinds of controversial matters" involving
gay people, and would "create other difficulties
within the department which would be likely to
harm the public perception of the Depart-
ment. '" 2 1 3 Ruling in favor of Bowers, the Eleventh
Circuit reasoned that:
1009, 1012 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) denying cert. to
730 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984). See alsoJos G6mez, The Public
Expression of Lesbian/Gay Personhood as Protected Speech, 1 L. &
INEQ. J. 121 (1983) (arguing that the expression of lesbian/
gay "personhood," whether in public or private, is entitled to
constitutional protection and that social pressure on gay men
and lesbians to closet their sexual orientation and physical
manifestations thereof, is tantamount to impermissible
forced expression under First Amendment analysis).
199 114 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 66
U.S.L.W. 3338 (Jan. 12, 1998).
200 Id. at 1100.
201 Id. at 1104.
202 Id. at 1108.
203 Id. at 1105.
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[G]overnment employees who have access to their em-
ployers confidences or who act as spokespersons for
their employers, as well as those employees with some
policy-making role, are in a special class of employees
and might seldom prevail under the First Amendment
in keeping their jobs when they conflict with their em-
ployers.
2 04
The four dissenting judges faulted the majority
for ignoring the Romer decision. Arguing that
although the Pickering balancing test is the right
measure for reviewing government employment
actions implicating the First Amendment, the dis-
senters reasoned that "[w]ith Romer in the bal-
ance, the scales tip decidedly in favor of Shahar
because Bowers' asserted interests are not a legiti-
mate basis for infringing Shahar's constitutionally-
protected right of intimate association. '"20 5 The
dissenters found that the Attorney General's justi-
fications were all based on "animosity toward
homosexuals" as a class, which Romer held not to
be a rational basis for state action.
2 °6
Although Shahar calls into question the out-of-
workplace first amendment rights of lesbian and
gay public employees, its impact on the right of
lesbian and gay public schoolteachers may be lim-
ited. The state's justification in Shahar-that the
nature of Shahar's job required her expression
and conduct both on and off the job to be consis-
tent with the Attorney General's political posi-
tions-is not analogous to the case of teachers.
Unlike junior attorneys in attorney general of-
fices, public schoolteachers are not in "policy-
making roles" that require them to "act as spokes-
persons for their employers." In addition, it is un-
likely that the out-of-school same-sex marriage of
a public schoolteacher would disrupt school activ-
ities to the same degree that Bowers claimed such a
marriage ceremony would disrupt the activities of
his office.
e. Prohibitions Against Same-Sex PDAs Fail
Under First Amendment Scrutiny
Because same-sex PDAs may be protectible ex-
204 Id. at 1103 (citing Bates v. Hunt, 3 F.3d 374, 378
(1lth Cir. 1993)); See Sims v. Metropolitan Dade County, 972
F.2d 1230, 1237-38 (11th Cir. 1992).
205 Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1126 (Birch, Cir.J., dissenting).
206 Id. at 1126-27 (citing Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628).
207 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
208 Id. at 577 n.4 (Scalia,J., concurring in the judgment).
209 142 CONG. REC. S9986, S9993 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 1996)
(Statement of Sen. Hatch).
210 Barnes, 501 U.S. 577 n.4 (Scalia, J. concurring in the
pression, government attempts to restrict such ex-
pression-such as a prohibition on same-sex
PDAs by teachers-likely would invoke the First
Amendment's freedom of expression guarantee.
Like Aaron Fricke's desire to attend the prom
with his same-sex date, a gay or lesbian school-
teacher's out-of-classroom public displays of affec-
tion (i.e., hand-holding, kissing, and hugging)
may count as significantly expressive symbolic
speech. In his concurrence to Barnes v. Glen Thea-
tre,2017 in which the Supreme Court found that
public nude dancing qualifies as "expressive con-
duct," Justice Antonin Scalia defined "inherently
expressive conduct" as conduct "that is normally
engaged in for the purpose of communicating an
idea, or perhaps an emotion, to someone else."
2
01
Clearly, "hold[ing] hands, walk[ing] arm in arm
• ..and engaging in some kissing," 2°19 what was
described during the Senate's ENDA debate as
PDAs, are acts which are "normally engaged in for
the purpose of communicating. .an emo-
tion... to someone else.
'"2 "
In reviewing a government action that inter-
feres with freedom of expression, it is first neces-
sary to determine the impetus of the action. If
the regulation of the conduct is not directly re-
lated to the expressive aspects or the content of
the activity and is therefore "content-neutral," the
O'Brien test is applied. As noted above, the Fricke
court opted to apply this content-neutral analysis,
reasoning that it was not the content of Aaron's
expression, but the threat of violence associated
with allowing Aaron to bring his same-sex date
that was the justification for restricting Aaron's
expression.2 1'
If, however, the regulation is directed at re-
stricting the content of the expression itself the
regulation is deemed "content-based," must be
treated as if it restricted the expression itself, and
must be subjected to First Amendment strict scru-
tiny.2 12 For example, the Supreme Court found
in Texas v. Johnson213 that Texas's overarching in-
judgment).
211 Fricke, 491 F.Supp. at 385.
212 See Cole & Eskridge, supra note 179, at 331; John Hart
Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization
and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARv. L. REV.
1482, 1497-98 (1975).
213 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (finding that the act of
burning the American flag is expressive conduct protected by
the First Amendment).
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terest in attempting to outlaw flag-burning was in
suppressing the message associated with the flag-
burning.214 Under strict First Amendment review
of content-based regulations, the regulation will
be sustained only if it (1) serves a compelling state
objective, and (2) is drawn as narrowly as possible
to achieve that objective. 21 5
Consequently, if a school board were to "take
action against" a teacher for engaging in same-sex
PDAs during non-school hours, such actions likely
would constitute a violation of the teacher's free-
dom of expression. Such actions clearly would be
content-based, given that the actions are targeted
directly at the expression (i.e. same-sex affection)
and not an objective unrelated to the expression.
That objective, which is based solely on social
prejudice against and discomfort with homosexu-
ality, is illegitimate.
Even if the strict free speech scrutiny applied to
content-based government actions did not apply
to a proscription of same-sex PDAs, it very likely
would be invalidated under O'Brien relaxed scru-
tiny. Perpetuating homophobia is not an "impor-
tant or substantial government interest," and thus
a ban on same-sex PDAs would fail the O'Brien
test.
f. Applying the Schoolteacher Speech Cases
Because our discussion of same-sex PDAs in this
instance involves teachers, a straightforward First
Amendment inquiry is inadequate to determine
whether a limitation on such expressive conduct
would be constitutionally permissible. Whether
the same-sex PDAs take place on or away from
school grounds may determine which line of
schoolteacher speech cases would apply.
214 See id.
215 See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70
(1981) (holding that a state university violated First Amend-
ment by refusing to allow student religious groups to meet
anywhere on campus, although non-religious student groups
were accorded that privilege); Metromedia, Inc. v. San Di-
ego, 453 U.S. 490, 515 (1981) (holding a San Diego ordi-
nance prohibiting all billboards containing non-commercial
messages except for certain categories (e.g., political cam-
paign signs, time, and temperature signs) unconstitutional
given that "[t]he city may not choose the appropriate sub-
jects for public discourse"). First Amendment protection,
however, is not accorded to "unprotected" categories of ex-
pression, which include defamation, advocacy of imminent
lawless behavior, "fighting words," and obscenity. See TRIBE,
supra note 89, §§ 12-12 to 12-13, at 861-86 (defamation),
§ 12-19, at 841-49 (lawless action), § 12-10, at 849-56 ("fight-
g. Same-Sex Out-of-Classroom PDAs are Protectible
Speech Under Pickering Test
The arguments made on the Senate floor
against ENDA concerning same-sex PDAs suggest
that the concern is not so much the same-sex
PDAs of teachers in public settings away from the
school itself but, more importantly, the displays of
same-sex affection in view of schoolchildren, in-
volving a schoolteacher outside of the school
building, for example, when the schoolteacher is
dropped-off at work in the morning or is picked-
up after the schoolday is over. These PDAs
should be treated as protected speech under the
Pickering test.
As discussed above, school authorities do not
have the power to control the out-of-classroom
speech of public schoolteachers that concerns
controversial matters of public importance and
that does not harm or disrupt the school's ability
to operate efficiently or inhibit the teacher's abil-
ity or fitness to carry out his or her teaching du-
ties. Like Aaron Fricke's decision to take a same-
sex date to his prom, which the court described as
a political statement, a schoolteacher's same-sex
PDA may have politically expressive value. 21 6
Moreover, it is highly unlikely that a gay or les-
bian schoolteacher's out-of-school same-sex PDAs
would in any way harm or disrupt the school's op-
erations or hamper the teacher's teaching abili-
ties. Like the teacher in Acanfora, whose acknowl-
edgment of his homosexuality to the press was
deemed insufficient grounds for termination,
teachers who engage in same-sex PDAs similarly
are not disrupting school operations or impeding
their effectiveness as teachers by engaging in such
PDAs. 217 Even if out-of-school same-sex PDAs did
ing words"), and § 12-16, at 904-19 (obscenity).
216 See Fri cke, 491 F. Supp. at 385. Even if same-sex PDAs
were deemed not to express a political message or were non-
public, however, such PDAs should still be entitled to First
Amendment protection. See EDITORS OF HAR\,'AP LAw RE-
VIEW, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW 77 n.23, 77 (1990)
(noting that the First Amendment protects political as well as
non-political speech. "In the context of sexual orientation,
social activity can both contribute to political debate and pro-
vide independent value and self-fulfillment to the speaker.")
and (analogizing to civil rights era, where "the political move-
ment for equal rights frequently took the form of demands
for equal treatment of individual citizens in social settings.").
217 See National Gay Task Force v. Board of Educ., 729
F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1984), affd 470 U.S. 903 (1985) (per
curiam) (invalidating as unconstitutional state law permitting
punishment for "public homosexual conduct," which in-
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have some negative effects on school operations
or teaching effectiveness, such effects most likely
would have been caused by societal prejudice
against lesbians and gay men, an impetus for dis-
crimination deemed illegitimate by Romer.
2. In-Classroom PDAs
There is little question that most PDAs between
teachers and their significant others in the school
building and in public view may not be appropri-
ate, regardless of sexual orientation. As explained
in the following section, what is most important
with respect to restrictions on in-school PDAs is
that they be equally applied to both straight and
gay teachers. Placing restrictions on displays of
same-sex affection, while permitting heterosexual
PDAs, very likely would be unconstitutional.
Moreover, as is the case with "proselytization," it is
highly unlikely that lesbian and gay schoolteach-
ers would risk theirjobs or their educational effec-
tiveness in order to engage in same-sex PDAs dur-
ing school hours, inside the school building. It is
conceivable that like most heterosexual teachers,
lesbian and gay teachers prefer to keep their fam-
ily life private in the course of carrying out their
teaching duties so as to not detract from their ed-
ucational mission. As the district court decision
in Acanfora recognized, "to some extent every
teacher has to go out of his way to hide his private
life ..... 218
a. Prohibitions Against Same-Sex PDAs Also Fail
Under Equal Protection Scrutiny
"Taking action" against teachers for out-of-class-
room same-sex PDAs, when no disciplinary action
is taken against heterosexual PDAs, not only
cluded "advocacy.").
218 Acanfora, 359 F. Supp. at 856.
219 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473
U.S. 432, 440 (1985); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 n.15
(1982).
220 FYicke, 491 F. Supp. at 381, 388 n.6 (citing Police
Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972), where the Supreme
Court invalidated an ordinance prohibiting picketing be-
cause it singled out labor picketing only and thus violated the
principle of neutral treatment of similarly situated speakers
("Because picketing plainly involves expressive conduct
within the protection of the First Amendment, discrimina-
tions among pickets must be tailored to serve a substantial
governmental interest."); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505
U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (citations omitted) (invalidating ordi-
nance banning cross burning because the ordinance did not
would violate the First Amendment, but also
would be a clear violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment's equal protection guarantee. More-
over, because such a discriminatory classification
is based on a fundamental right, i.e. symbolic ex-
pression (same-sex PDAs), the classification is sub-
ject to strict scrutiny, regardless of whether the
class discriminated against is a designated "sus-
pect class."2 19 Typically, a government classifica-
tion is required only to bear a rational relation-
ship to a legitimate public purpose, but that
where the classification "encompasses a suspect
class or burdens a fundamental right ... the gov-
ernment [is] held to a stricter standard ofjustifi-
cation."2 2o1
Under strict first amendment scrutiny, the clas-
sification in question is upheld only if it is "neces-
sary" to promote a "compelling" government
interest.22' There is no valid, nevermind compel-
ling, government interest in singling out gay and
lesbian teachers for discrimination solely to ad-
vance obsolete and vague notions of morality and
what constitutes a "good role model."
Moreover, given society's gradually increasing
understanding and acceptance of gay people, it is
highly unlikely that the out-of-classroom same-sex
PDAs feared by certain Senators (i.e., hugging,
holding hands, etc.) would cause even the slight-
est disruption in school order or in the teacher's
effectiveness in the classroom. As the Supreme
Court made clear in Tinker v. Des Moines Independ-
ent Community School District,222 mere "discomfort
and unpleasantness" are insufficient disruptions
to overcome the right to freedom of expres-
sion.2 23 An attempt to accommodate or cater to
the prejudices and discomfort of heterosexuals to-
ward gay people, by definition, cannot be a legiti-
mate state interest.2 24 And as the Court said in
treat all symbolic "fighting words" equally, but selectively pro-
hibited those based on race, color, creed, religion or gender:
"[t] he First Amendment generally prevents government from
proscribing speech or even expressive conduct because of
disapproval of the ideas expressed.").
221 See Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95; see also TRIBE, supra note 89,
§ 16-9, at 1459.
222 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
223 Id. at 509.
224 See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) ("Pri-
vate biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law
cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect."); see also
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448 ("[M]ere negative attitudes, or fear,
unsubstantiated by factors which are properly cognizable in a
zoning proceeding, are not permissible bases for treating a
home for the mentally retarded differently from apartment
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"if the constitutional conception of 'equal protec-
tion of the laws' means anything, it must at the
very least mean that a bare . . . desire to harm a
politically unpopular group cannot constitute a le-
gitimate governmental interest."226
In sum, although the Supreme Court has not
yet deemed sexual orientation a suspect classifica-
tion meriting heightened scrutiny, promising lan-
guage in such recent cases as Romer and Nabozny
confirm that unreasonable distinctions between
gay and straight teachers are constitutionally im-
permissible. As a simple matter of fairness and
equity, gay and lesbian teachers should not be dis-
ciplined for actions for which heterosexual teach-
ers are not disciplined. The double standard ad-
vocated by the Senators opposing ENDA very
clearly would do just that, without promoting any
valid government interest.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although virtually none of the arguments
raised against ENDA during the 1996 Senate floor
debates were new, these arguments were strikingly
outmoded and in direct conflict with scientific evi-
dence concerning the nature of sexual orienta-
tion and with well-settled First and Fourteenth
Amendment principles and caselaw. Given the in-
creasing scientific understanding that homosexu-
ality generally is fixed and unchangeable, the
claim that lesbian and gay schoolteachers are de
facto poor role models who are apt to recruit their
students to homosexuality lacks any valid basis.
Sexual orientation has no impact on a person's
ability to be a successful schoolteacher admired by
students and adults alike.
Moreover, the presence of lesbian or gay teach-
ers in the schools not only benefits all children by
enhancing the overall diversity of school faculty, it
benefits lesbian and gay youth in particular.
Given the increased propensity of these youths to
commit suicide as a result of feeling isolated and
ostracized, the existence of lesbian or gay teachers
houses, multiple dwellings, and the like .... [T]he city may
not avoid the strictures of [the Equal Protection] Clause by
deferring to the wishes or objections of some fraction of the
body politic.").
on the school faculty may make the difference be-
tween life or death for many gay and* lesbian chil-
dren.
In addition, the fact that the Supreme Court in
its Romer decision found that animosity toward gay
people is not a legitimate basis for state action
also makes it highly unlikely that a school board
could refuse to hire lesbian or gay schoolteachers
for no other reason than the notion that lesbians
and gay men are intrinsically immoral and thus,
poor role models for their students. To borrow
from Justice Kennedy, this a school administrator
cannot do.
Similarly, the notion that ENDA somehow
would permit lesbian or gay schoolteachers to
proselytize in the classroom is baseless. ENDA's
only effect will be to ensure that lesbian and gay
employees and candidates are judged by their
work performance and not on the basis of their
sexual orientation. Consequently, ENDA will not
affect longstanding and well-settled precedent ac-
cording school boards and school administrators
expansive jurisdiction over the in-classroom
speech of public schoolteachers.
Also, the claim that ENDA would prohibit a
school board from disciplining a gay teacher for
public displays of affection with a same-sex part-
ner during non-school hours is misplaced. It is
the First Amendment's free speech guarantee,
and not ENDA, that would protect such PDAs,
which very likely may be deemed political or sym-
bolic speech.
Finally, perhaps the most persuasive evidence
exposing the invalidity of the alarmist claims
raised against ENDA involving schoolteachers is
the fact that these claims have not materialized in
the states and local jurisdictions with ENDA-like
laws securely in plade. The protection of lesbian
and gay public schoolteachers from discrimina-
tion in the workplace on the basis of sexual orien-
tation in many state and local jurisdictions has not
engendered the negative consequences predicted
by Senators Aschroft and Nickles, among others,
in opposing ENDA on a federal level.
225 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
226 Id. at 534, cited in Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628; see also
Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 63 (1982).
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